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Abstract
Economists and policymakers have long believed that access to electricity is es-
sential for industrial development, and ultimately growth. Despite this consensus,
there is limited evidence of this relationship. In this thesis, I ask whether electrifi-
cation causes industrial development. I study the effect of the extensive margin of
electrification (grid expansion) on the extensive margin of industrial development
(firm entry and exit). I combine newly digitized data from the Indonesian state elec-
tricity company with rich manufacturing census data. To deal with endogenous
grid placement, I build a hypothetical transmission grid based on colonial incum-
bent infrastructure and geography. The main instrumental variable is the distance
to this hypothetical grid. I examine the effect of electrification on local industrial
development. To understand when and how electrification can cause industrial de-
velopment, I shed light on an important economic mechanism - firm turnover. I
find that electrification causes industrial development, represented by an increase
in the number of manufacturing firms, manufacturing workers, and output. Electri-
fication increases firm entry rates, but also exit rates. Overall, electrification creates
new industrial activity, as opposed to reorganizing it across space. I then evalu-
ate the impact of electrification on firm-level performance. I find that connected
firms are larger, more likely to exit, and younger. This is consistent with higher
turnover at the market level. I look at the implications of the previous results on
industry productivity. Higher turnover rates lead to higher average productivity and
induce reallocation towards more productive firms. This is consistent with electrifi-
cation lowering entry costs, increasing competition and forcing unproductive firms
to exit more often. Without the possibility of entry or competitive effects of entry,
the effects of electrification are likely to be smaller. I use detailed product-level pro-
duction data to structurally estimate a quantity-based production function, which
when combined with price data, allows me to estimate marginal cost. Electrification
substantially reduces the cost of production of existing products and their prices.
While mark-ups don’t change for incumbent firm-product pairs, the average mark-
up increases in the market. This is due to a selection effect where products produced
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The idea that electrification causes industrial development dates back as far as Lenin1.
Even today, many governments and aid agencies2 invest in energy infrastructure
projects, especially in developing countries. In 2017, the Indonesian government
invested around $1.8 billion in electricity, 7% out of its total budget for infrastruc-
ture. The Kenyan government is currently investing $2.1 billion in the grid expan-
sion to rural areas. The Kenyan policymakers expect this investment “to enhance
industrialization and emergence of [...] industries”. There is consensus among pol-
icymakers that access to electricity is an essential ingredient for industrial develop-
ment, which is considered a fundamental driver of growth.
However, recent economic evidence shows that the benefits of electrification are
not as large as previously thought3. If public funds are limited, this presents an
argument against investing in energy infrastructure and instead in favor of allocat-
ing funds to other types of public expenditure such as health or education. In fact,
electrification in various African countries has increased substantially over the last
decades, but these countries have not witnessed industrial development. So in this
thesis I ask, does electrification cause industrial development? Or do these invest-
ments have little impact on the pace of industrial development?
To answer this question, I use a rapid, government-led grid expansion during a pe-
1Lenin (1920)“Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country.” Lenin
believed that electrification would transform Russia from a “small-peasant basis into a large-scale
industrial basis”
2The World Bank has committed to lending $6.3 billion to the Energy and Mining sector
worldwide. From The World Bank Annual Report 2017, http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/
annual-report.
3e.g. Lee, Miguel, and Wolfram (2016) who focus on residential electrification
11
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
riod of rapid industrialization in Indonesia. I travelled multiple times to Indonesia
and put together a comprehensive data-set covering a period of 11 years from 1990
to 2000 from various current and historical sources. I first map the expansion of the
electric transmission grid over time and space in Java, the main island in Indone-
sia. I then map manufacturing activity in 25,000 administrative areas for more than
29,000 unique firm observations in Java, where 80% of Indonesian manufacturing
firms are located. These data allow me to understand when and how electrification
affects industrial development.
The research in this thesis is the first to examine the effect of the extensive mar-
gin of electrification (grid expansion) on the extensive margin of industrial devel-
opment (firm entry and exit). The effect of the extensive margin of electrification,
i.e. extending the electric grid to new locations, has been studied on employment
(Dinkelman (2011)) and general development-level indices (Lipscomb, Mobarak,
and Barham (2013)). Other papers have estimated the demand and cost of rural
electrification for households in a controlled environment (Lee, Miguel, and Wol-
fram (2016)). The link between electrification and firms has been studied on the
intensive margin and is mostly focused on the effect of shortages on firm outcomes
(e.g. Allcott, Collard-Wexler, and O’Connell (2016)). Variation in shortages creates
short-run firm responses by affecting the input price of electricity which in turn
affects the firm’s production decision on the intensive margin. The evidence on
the intensive margin of electrification and industrial development is important, but
the effect of the extensive margin of electrification on industrialization is poten-
tially different, and of greater relevance to those interested in long run development.
Changes on the extensive margin of electrification, meaning whether the firm can
be connected to the electric grid or not, can create long-run firm responses by af-
fecting the extensive margin of firm decisions, namely, entry and exit.
An economic mechanism through which electrification potentially affects indus-
trial development is therefore firm turnover, driven by the entry and exit of firms.
Electrifying a new location can influence firms’ entry and exit decisions in that par-
ticular location. This changes the composition of firms in the market, and hence,
average productivity. Whether or not electrification enhances or decreases manu-
facturing productivity is therefore a question that requires empirical verification.
Indonesia is an appropriate setting to answer this research question. For histori-
cal reasons, the Indonesian power sector remained underdeveloped compared to
12
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countries with a similar GDP4. In 1990, Java, the most developed and densely pop-
ulated island in Indonesia, was only around 40% electrified. The island has since
witnessed a massive and successful government-led effort to expand access to elec-
tricity up until the year 2000. During that period, transmission capacity in Java
quadrupled and electrification ratios increased to more than 90%. At the same time,
Indonesia experienced fast growth in the manufacturing sector. This allows me to
match modern type firm-level micro data with sufficient recent variation in access
to the grid to detailed data on the electrification infrastructure.
Establishing a causal link between electrification and industrial development is em-
pirically challenging. In any emerging economy, infrastructure and industrializa-
tion occur simultaneously, and separating demand-side from supply-side factors
is difficult. This poses an empirical challenge in identifying the effect of electrifi-
cation on industrial outcomes. The empirical strategy I implement in this thesis
tries to make progress on this issue by using an instrumental variable strategy in-
spired by the transportation infrastructure literature5. I exploit a supply-side natu-
ral experiment based on the need of the state electricity monopoly to have a single
interconnected electricity grid in Java. I construct a hypothetical interconnected
electric transmission grid that is a function of incumbent disconnected electrifica-
tion infrastructure built by Dutch colonial electric utilities and geographic cost fac-
tors. The hypothetical grid abstracts from endogenous demand factors that could
be driving the expansion of the grid and focuses on cost factors only. The use of
the colonial infrastructure also means that the incumbent infrastructure is unlikely
to be correlated with economic forces in 1990. Distance to the hypothetical grid
is used to instrument for endogenous access to electricity, conditional on various
controls, including other types of infrastructure. A second empirical challenge that
is less discussed in the literature is a violation of the Stable Unit Treatment Value
Assumption (SUTVA). SUTVA requires that the treatment of one unit does not affect
the outcome of other units, in other words, no spillovers or general equilibrium ef-
fects. In the context of this paper, this means that electrifying one location should
not affect the industrial outcomes of other locations. I address this issue by con-
ducting various empirical tests for general equilibrium effects.
The data-sets used in this paper come from various sources. I collected and digitized
4McCawley (1978)
5For example, see Banerjee, Duflo, and Qian (2012), Chandra and Thompson (2000), Redding and
Turner (2014) and Faber (2014)
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spatial data on the electrification infrastructure from the Indonesian state electric-
ity monopoly Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN) in Jakarta. This includes data on
the location, operation year, and capacity of power plants and transmission sub-
stations. To build a time-series, I use administrative documents from PLN. Gaps
are then filled from World Bank loan reports from 1969 to 1992. I then construct
measures of access to the grid based on the distance from the centroid of a desa to
the nearest transmission substation. A desa is the lowest administrative division in
Indonesia. To study firm turnover, I construct yearly maps of manufacturing activ-
ity in Java, which includes the number of firms, manufacturing output, number of
manufacturing workers, and entry and exit rates in any desa in Java. The informa-
tion on manufacturing activity at the desa level comes form the Indonesian annual
manufacturing census 1990-2000. This is a census of Indonesian manufacturing
firms with 20 or more employees. The firm-level data is also used to get information
on firm output, inputs, exit and entry decisions, as well as to get estimates of rev-
enue productivity. I complement the firm-level data with product-level data where
I observe product prices. These data allow me to estimate physical productivity,
marginal cost, and mark-up. Together with revenue productivity, these variables
will allow me to look at the effect of electrification on different measures of produc-
tivity. I then combine productivity estimates with firm market share data to study
the effect of electrification on reallocation at an aggregate industry level.
This paper contributes to the literature on infrastructure and development. A strand
of literature examines the effect of different types of infrastructure on economic out-
comes. These include the effect of dams on agricultural productivity and poverty
(Duflo and Pande (2007)), and the effect of transportation (roads, railways, high-
ways) infrastructure on regional economic outcomes (examples include Donald-
son (2010), Banerjee, Duflo, and Qian (2012), Faber (2014), Donaldson and Horn-
beck (2016), and Gertler, Gonzalez-Navarro, Gracner, and Rothenberg (2014)). In
terms of electrification infrastructure, a growing literature studies generally the re-
lationship between energy and development. Ryan (2017) studies the effect of ex-
panding the transmission infrastructure on the competitiveness on the Indian elec-
tricity market. In another paper, Ryan (2018) experimentally investigates the rela-
tionship between energy productivity and energy demand among Indian manufac-
turing plants. A subset of the literature evaluates the effects of grid expansion as
in Dinkelman (2011) who estimates the effect of electrification on employment in
South Africa and Lipscomb, Mobarak, and Barham (2013) where they look at the
effect of electrification in Brazil. Rud (2012) looks at the effect of electrification on
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industrialization in India at the state level. He shows that industrial output in a state
increases with electrification.
While these papers focus on the extensive margin of electricity supply, many pa-
pers study the relationship between electricity supply and firms on the intensive
margin, i.e. shortages. Reinikka and Svensson (1999) show that unreliable power
supply in Uganda reduces private investment productivity by forcing firms to invest
in generators and other low-productivity substitutes for reliable public provision of
power. Fisher-Vanden, Mansur, and Wang (2015) use Chinese firm-level panel data
to examine the response of firms to power shortages. They find that firms respond
by re-optimizing among inputs, which increases their unit cost of production but
allows them to avoid substantial productivity losses. Allcott, Collard-Wexler, and
O’Connell (2016) find that electricity shortages in India reduce revenue but have no
effect on revenue productivity.
Another strand of literature this paper is related to is the one on productivity and
firm dynamics. Many papers study the determinants of firm turnover and its role
in reallocating resources from less productive to more productive firms (examples
include Syverson (2004), Syverson (2007), Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008),
Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2013), Nguyen (2014)). An extensive liter-
ature as in Tybout (2000), Hsieh and Klenow (2009), and Bloom, Mahajan, McKen-
zie, and Roberts (2010), aims at explaining the productivity gap between firms in
developing countries and firms in developed countries. These differences in pro-
ductivity across countries imply substantial differences in aggregate performance.
Infrastructure is one suggested explanation to the lower productivity level of firms
in developing countries, in particular, access to electricity. I contribute to this litera-
ture in this thesis by linking infrastructure to reallocation and turnover in explaining
the low productivity of firms in developing countries.
My results show that electrification causes industrial development at a local level by
increasing manufacturing activity in desas. Access to the grid increases the number
of firms, number of workers in manufacturing, and manufacturing output. Interest-
ingly, electrification increases firm turnover by increasing not only entry rates, but
also exit rate.
At the firm level, I find that electrification causes average firm size to increase, both
in terms of how much output the firm produces and how much inputs it demands.
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The results on firm turnover are confirmed in the firm-level analysis. Electrification
increases the probability of exit, making it harder for inefficient firms to survive. In
addition, electrification shifts the firm age distribution towards younger firms. This
is a sign of churning in the industry, created by increased entry (more young firms)
and increased exit (firms die more often).
At both the desa-level and the firm-level, I test for general equilibrium effects and
I find that electrification does indeed create new industrial activity, as opposed to
only relocating economic activity from non-electrified areas to electrified areas. This
implies that there are no major violations of SUTVA in this particular setting.
I also find that electrification increases average productivity, consistent with higher
firm turnover. I use a decomposition of an aggregate revenue-weighted average
productivity following Olley and Pakes (1996). I find that electrification increases
allocative efficiency where the covariance between firm productivity and market
shares is higher in electrified areas. These results are theoretically consistent with
a decrease in the entry cost, suggesting that electrification increases aggregate pro-
ductivity by allowing more productive firms in the market, increasing firm turnover,
and enhancing allocative efficiency.
Finally, I find that electrification decreases average marginal cost of production. In-
cumbent firm-product pairs experience a substantial decrease in the marginal cost
of production which they completely pass through to consumers. However, firm-
product pairs that are selected into the market by electrification charge a higher
mark-up, possibly because electrification allows firms to produce more differenti-
ated products.
This thesis is formed of 7 chapters. Chapter 2 introduces the new data on the In-
donesian electrification infrastructure and lays out the empirical strategy I follow in
the rest of the thesis. Chapter 3 presents evidence on the effect of electrification on
local industrial outcomes and investigates how electrification affects the organiza-
tion of industrial activity across space. In chapter 4, I evaluate how electrification
affects the performance and survival of firms. Chapter 5 examines the implications
of electrification on industry productivity and reallocation. Chapter 6 explores how








In the first chapter of this thesis, I present the data and the empirical strategy that
are common to all the subsequent chapters. A significant part of the work for this
thesis involved collecting new data on the electrification infrastructure in Indone-
sia. In what follows, I introduce these data in detail and present the various data-
sets that I have constructed for the analysis. I highlight how these data are useful for
understanding the causal effect of electrification and the economic mechanism in
play.
The credibility of any empirical work relies on the validity of the empirical strategy
used to identify causal effects. I design an instrumental variable approach based on
a hypothetical transmission grid that abstracts from endogenous demand factors
and focuses on cost factors. Here I present my empirical strategy and my identifica-
tion assumption, and finally provide a couple of tests for its validity.
I start by providing a brief institutional background to the Indonesian power sector,
going back to colonial Indonesia and ending with the collapse of the Suharto regime.
I then present the new data I have collected for this project. Finally, I describe the
main empirical strategy. These data and empirical strategy form the basis of the
analysis that follows in the later chapters.
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2.2 Institutional Background
2.2.1 History of the Indonesian Power Sector
Knowing the historical context of the power sector in Indonesia is crucial to under-
stand why the Indonesian electricity supply was underdeveloped, including in Java.
During the period of Dutch colonization of Indonesia, access to electricity was un-
equal and mainly reserved to colonial establishments. Between 1953 and 1957 the
three Dutch owned electric utilities in Indonesia were nationalized by the Govern-
ment. Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN), the Indonesian state electricity monopoly,
became fully responsible for generating, transmitting and distributing electricity in
Indonesia, and still is until today. The transfer was not friendly, and was without a
transition period where the new Indonesian management could have been trained
by its colonial predecessors and many documents were destroyed in the process.
Political unrest, lack of funds, hyperinflation and the lack of qualified management
and engineers led to a period of decline in efficiency, poor operating conditions, and
inadequate expansion (McCawley (1971)). This in turn led to a large electric supply
deficit, which meant low household electrification ratios and that businesses and
industries had to rely on self-generation. Power supply in Indonesia was poor even
relative to other countries with a similar GDP per capita. To put things into perspec-
tive, in 1975, Indonesian GDP per capital was around $216, higher than the GDP per
capita in India of $162. However, in the same year, electricity production per capita
in Indonesia was only about one-fifth the level in India (McCawley (1978)). Over the
next decades, with the help of various international aid agencies, PLN was expand-
ing steadily both in terms of physical and human capital.
2.2.2 Objective of the Government of Indonesia 1990-2000
The main sources of electricity supply in Indonesia in the late 1980s and early 1990s
comprised of PLN, the state electricity monopoly, and self-generation (around 40%
of generating capacity), mainly by the manufacturing sector. As Indonesia was wit-
nessing an expansion of the PLN generation capacity, the manufacturing sector was
shifting from relying exclusively on self-generation towards the use of captive gen-
eration for solely on a stand-by basis. Trends in PLN sales and captive power sug-
gested that manufacturing firms, even after incurring the sunk cost of acquiring a
generator, prefer grid electricity. This suggests that the marginal price of electric-
ity from the grid is lower that the marginal price of electricity from self-generation.
In 1989, the level of electricity consumption per capital was still low in Indonesia
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(137.5 kWh) relative to other countries at the same development level and its neigh-
bours (Malaysia 1,076 kWh, India 257 kWh, Philippines 361 kWh, and Thailand 614
kWh.)1.
This low level of electricity consumption was due to the lack of supply facilities.
PLN’s investment program in the late eighties was designed to meet the goals set
by the Government’s Five-Year Development Program (REPELITA V) by 1994. These
included a 75% electrification ratio in urban areas, 29% electrification ratio over-
all, and finally, the substitution of 80% of captive generation by the industrial sec-
tor. The objective of the Government at that time was to replace self-generation,
i.e. providing grid electricity to non-connected incumbents, as opposed to expand-
ing the grid to industrialize new locations. The subsequent Five-Year Development
Program (REPELITA VI 1994-1999) by the Indonesian government had the following
objectives for the power sector: (i) provide adequate, reliable, and reasonably priced
supply of energy to rapidly growing economy, (ii) conserve and diversify the sources
of energy, and (iii) minimize social and environmental adverse impacts. Goal (i)
illustrates the simultaneity problem of growing adequate infrastructure provision
and economic growth2. The government of Indonesia was investing heavily in elec-
tricity supply to keep up with a rapidly growing economy, which poses the empirical
challenge of identifying the causal effect of the expansion of electricity supply on in-
dustrial development. In 1997, the Asian financial crisis hit, followed by the end of
the Suharto dictatorship and political unrest, which all led to a lack of funds. Invest-
ment in the power sector continued during that period, albeit at a slower pace. By
2000, more than 90% of firms Java had access to electricity.
Figure 2.1 presents the dramatic increase in electrification ratios in Java during the
sample period. Figure 2.1a shows the spatial distribution of electrification ratios in
Java in 1990. Electricity was mostly concentrated in the capital city of Java, Jakarata,
but also the cities Bandung, Yogyajakarta, and Surabaya. The expansion of electric-
ity over time can be seen in the increase electrification ratios in 1993 (figure 2.1b),
1996 (figure 2.1c), and finally in the year 2000 (figure 2.1d), when most of Java was
fully electrified.
1Source: IEA Statistics 2014
2Source: Official planning documents.
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Figure 2.1: Desa-Level Electrification Ratios 1990 to 2000.
Source: PODES, BPS
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2.3 New Data on Electrification in Java, 1990-2000
In order to evaluate the impact of electrification on industrial development in Java, I
have constructed a new panel data-set on 24,824 Javanese desas, the lowest admin-
istrative division in Indonesia. The data-set follows these desas annually from 1990
to 2000, a period during which electrification in Java increased from 40% to almost
100% as can be seen in figure 2.1.
I start by constructing a time-series of the electricity transmission network in Java
between 1990 and 2000 using data from various sources. Java is the most dense is-
land in Indonesia with 60% of the population and 80% of manufacturing firms3. I
travelled multiple times to Jakarta, and I spent a considerable amount of time and
resources collecting and digitizing data from current and historical administrative
records from PLN. I digitized information on the location, capacity and operation
date of equipment within power plants and transmission substations in Java from
the PLN Head Office in Jakarta. The main sources of the raw data are (i) inventory
tables of transmission transformers within each transmission substation (see figure
2.13 in appendix 2.6 section 2.A.), and (ii) maps (digital, for example figure 2.14 in
the appendix and paper figures 2.3 and 2.4) of the transmission network in Java.
To build the time-series from 1990 to 2000, gaps in administrative data were filled
using World Bank power project reports, which evaluate electricity infrastructure
loans given by the World Bank to Indonesian government between 1969 and 1996. In
addition, because location data from PLN is not always accurate, I manually cross-
checked power plant and substation coordinates using data downloaded from OSM
(Open Street Maps). The resulting data-set is a panel of all transmission substations
in Java. Figure 2.2 shows the expansion of the grid during the sample period where
the yellow bolts represent transmission substations.
3Source: author’s calculations.
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Figure 2.2: Expansion of the Grid 1990-2000
The expansion of the transmission grid in Java during that period was rapid and
substantial as shown by the summary statistics in table 2.1. In 1990, the number
of substations was 115. By 2000, there was a total of 279 transmission substations
in Java. Total electricity transmission capacity increased from 6620 MVA to 25061
MVA, almost 4 times.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics: Electrification Infrastructure
Variable 1990 2000
Number of Substations 115 279
Total Capacity(MVA) 6619.58 25061.28
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2.4 Industrial Outcomes
There are multiple units of analysis. I start my empirical analysis by looking at the
effect of access on desa-level manufacturing outcomes. A desa is the lowest admin-
istrative division in Indonesia4. Data on desa level boundaries were acquired from
BIG, the Indonesian National Mapping Agency. To get information on manufactur-
ing activity in these desas, I use the Indonesian annual census of all manufactur-
ing firms in Indonesia with 20 or more employees, where I observe in which desa
each firm is located. I restrict the analysis to firms located in Java, which consti-
tute around 80% of all Medium and Large firms in Indonesia. This allows me to
create variables such as the number of manufacturing firms, number of manufac-
turing workers and total manufacturing output in each desa. The resulting data-set
is a yearly balanced panel of all desas in Java from 1990 to 2000. Table 2.2 presents
some summary statistics of these desas. On average, around 60% have access to the
grid over the sample period. The average number of medium or large firms per desa
is less than 1. However, the median is 0. This shows that most desas in fact have
zero manufacturing firms since I include all the desas in Java in the sample regard-
less of whether it has any manufacturing firms or not. The sample of desas includes
all the administrative divisions that cover the island of Java, and these could be ur-
ban, rural, residential, and so on. Conditional on having a positive number of firms,
the average number of firms per desa is around 4 firms. The last three rows of table
2.2 show that there is substantial variation on how large these desas are in terms of
population and area. The final total number of desas per year used in the analysis is
around 24,0005.
4There are 4 administrative divisions in Indonesia: province, regency, district and desa.
5Some desas were excluded as part of the identification strategy. See section 2.5 for more details.
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Table 2.2: Desa-Level Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median Min Max
Access 0.58 1 0 1
Number of firms 0.9 0 0 204
Number of firms > 0 4.2 2 1 204
Area (km2) 5.7 4.3 1 540
Population 4,500 3,332 36 800,000
Pop. Density (per km2) 2,548 1,451 7.7 36,413
Number of desas 23,770
I use information from the Desa Potential Statistics (PODES) survey for 1990, 1993,
1996 and 2000. The PODES data-set contains on all Indonesian desas, which I use to
get data on desa level characteristics such as population, political status, legal status
and most importantly, various infrastructure variables. These include information
on the type of infrastructure available in the desa such as railway, motor station,
river pier, and airport. In addtion, I use GIS data on cities, waterways, coastline and
roads in Java. I measure the distance from each desa (centroid) to each of these
geographic features in addition to the nearest electric substation and the hypothet-
ical least cost grid. I also use data on elevation to measure land gradient at each
location. This data is used to construct a digital map of desas in Java with various
desa-level characteristics over time.
I then take advantage of the richness of information in the firm-level data from the
census of manufacturing and analyze the effect of access to electricity on firm-level
outcomes. Table 2.3 shows the distribution of firms across industries and access
ratios in 1990 and 2000. The industries are ordered by the number of firms in that
industry, giving a clear picture of the Indonesian manufacturing sector. The largest
five industries are food and beverages, textiles, non-metallic mineral products (e.g.
cement, clay, etc..), wearing apparel, and furniture, forming 60% of the manufactur-
ing sector in Java. Between 1990 and 2000, the total number of manufacturing firms
in Java has increased by almost 50%. Columns (3) and (4) show the access ratio in
1990 and 2000, respectively. There has been an increase in the access ratio in almost
all industries to varying degrees. The only industry that witnessed a decrease in the
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access ratio is furniture, but that can be explained by the massive entry to the furni-
ture sector, where the number of firms tripled over the decade.
Table 2.3: Industry-Level Summary Statistics
Observations Access
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Industry 1990 2000 1990 2000
Food and beverages 2,035 2,817 0.63 0.86
Textiles 1,356 1,600 0.69 0.92
Non-metallic products 947 1,413 0.71 0.91
Wearing Apparel, fur 864 1,325 0.75 0.90
Furniture 578 1,380 0.77 0.74
Rubber and plastic 591 867 0.85 0.96
Tobacco products 812 691 0.22 0.83
Chemicals 524 745 0.90 0.92
Wood products 314 653 0.78 0.88
Fabricated metals 315 612 0.87 0.98
Leather and footwear 239 415 0.87 0.99
Printing and publishing 237 272 0.83 0.99
Machinery and equipment 158 246 0.82 1.00
Paper products 132 301 0.83 0.99
Electrical machinery 131 174 0.99 1.00
Motor Vehicles 121 168 0.91 1.00
Other Transport 106 142 0.55 0.99
Basic metals 76 155 0.96 1.00
Radio, TV equipment 58 112 0.97 0.99
Medical equipment 34 40 0.88 1.00
Coke, petroleum, fuel 2 19 1.00 0.95
Mean 1002 1356 0.70 0.90
Total 9,630 14,199
The final level of analysis is at the product level. I supplement the firm-level data
with product-level data at the 9 digit level where I observe the sales and physical
output of each product produced by the firm. I can therefore calculate product
price and using structural techniques of estimating production functions, I estimate
physical productivity. This product data is however only available from 1994 on-
ward.
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2.5 Empirical Strategy
The expansion of the grid is demand driven. In fact, PLN follows a demand forecast
methodology where they forecast demand in a certain area and compare it to the
existing supply infrastructure. PLN then decides to expand it if they believe there
will be a gap between supply and demand in the future. I explain this methodol-
ogy in detail in Appendix 2.B. Importantly, this methodology implies that the bias in
ordinary least square estimates can go either way. On the one hand, more produc-
tive regions have higher demand forecasts, which means that OLS will be upward
bias. On the other hand, areas with generally poor infrastructure, where firms are
less productive, will have a higher gap between demand forecasts and existing sup-
ply, meaning that OLS will be downward bias. Another element in the decision of
expanding the grid is the cost of construction, which is potentially exogenous.
Using the data described above, I estimate the effect of access to the grid Accessv pt
on outcome Yv pt of desa v , province p and year t using the following specification:
Yv pt =α+βAccessv pt +ηVv pt +γp +δt +²v pt (2.1)
and the firm-level equivalent where I estimate the effect access Accessv pst on out-
come yi v pst of firm i in desa v , province p, industry s and year t .
yi v pst =α+βAccessv pst +νXi v pst +ηVv pt +γp +δst +²i v pst (2.2)
where Xi v pst is a vector of firm controls, Vv pst is a vector if desa level controls, γp
are province fixed effects, δt are year fixed effects and δst are industry-by-year fixed
effects.
Electricity grids are placed endogenously to industrial outcomes. Even conditional
on all the listed controls, estimating the above model by OLS will give biased results.
In order to deal with the endogeneity problem, I propose an instrumental variable
approach exploiting a supply-side natural experiment. Up until the late 1980’s, the
electricity grid in Java was not interconnected. My empirical strategy exploits the
fact that PLN needed to build an interconnection of the grid, which occurred by the
start of my sample period. This interconnection created a change in the probability
of receiving electricity in the future in certain desas that lie between two grids. The
section below describes how this strategy in detail.
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2.5.1 Hypothetical Least Cost Grid
In 1969, electricity grid in Java consisted of 5 different disconnected grids across the
island (Figure 2.3). Having disconnected grids is inefficient, prevents load-sharing
across regions, and increases the price of supplying electricity. Therefore, the 1970’s
and the 1980’s witnessed a huge and successful effort by PLN with the help of agen-
cies such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to connect the various
grids on the island (Figure 2.4). Various transmission lines were built for the main
purpose of interconnecting the grid. As a result, desas nearby the lines connecting
the grids faced a positive shock to the probability of receiving electricity access in
the future as it is cheaper to connect desas that are closer to the existing network.
Distance to these transmission lines is therefore a potential instrument for access,
however, the lines themselves could be endogenously placed.
Figure 2.3: Java Network 1969
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To deal with the concern that transmission lines could be targeted at areas that are
different than others, for example, non-farming land, I create a hypothetical grid to
connect the main power plants in the separate grids. In total, I consider 15 power
plants which I identify from historical maps as the main power plants in the 5 sepa-
rate grids. I implement the following procedure to construct the hypothetical least
cost grid:
1. For each pixel on the map, I assign a cost value based on elevation and water-
way data. Cost is a simple linear function of these two variables.
2. I calculate the least cost path for each pair of power plants based on the cost
data.
3. I use Kruskal’s algorithm6 to find the least cost combination of least cost paths
such that all power plants are interconnected. The resulting network is the
hypothetical least cost transmission grid.
Figure 2.5 shows the resulting hypothetical least cost grid. The distance to the hy-
pothetical least cost grid is then used as the instrumental variable.
6Kruskal’s algorithm is a minimum spanning tree algorithm. The minimum spanning tree is the
spanning tree that has the lowest cost among all the possible spanning trees. The cost of the spanning
tree is defined as the sum of the weights of all the edges in the tree.
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Figure 2.5: Hypothetical Least Cost Transmission Grid
Figure 2.6 illustrates the empirical strategy in a simplified manner. Consider two
disconnected grids Grid 1 and Grid 2. These represent the incumbent infrastruc-
ture built by the Dutch electricity company and were existent by 1969. During the
1970s and the 1980s, the two grids became interconnected by the green line. Con-
sider two firms (or desas) A and B that only differ in their distance to the green line.
Because Firm A is closer to the green line, it is then more likely to get connected to
the electricity grid in the 1990s compared to Firm B. The blue lines therefore repre-
sent the instrument. Because of potential concerns regarding the placement of the
green line, I create a hypothetical green line that is based solely on cost factors. The
hypothetical least cost grid is essentially an instrument for the actual interconnec-
tion transmission network.
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Figure 2.6: Empirical Strategy
Grid 1 Grid 2
Firm A
Firm B
In my empirical strategy, I control for various desa-level characteristics. One con-
cern is that the location of the power plants is endogenous. In Java, many of these
power plants are hydroelectric power plants, meaning their location is tied to the
natural source. In addition, these power plants have been built by the Dutch electric
utilities decades before the start of the sample period7. It is likely then that the fac-
tors determining the location of these power plants do not directly affect outcomes
in 1990 (conditional on controls). Nonetheless, I exclude desas within a certain ra-
dius of power plants to deal with the concern that power plants are endogenously
located. Power plants are built close to the consumption centers that they are meant
to supply electricity to in order to minimize transmission losses. Because consump-
tion centers are typically cities and urban areas, one concern is that the instrument
is correlated to distance to the closest city. To alleviate this concern, I include dis-
tance to the nearest city as a control variable.
Because most economic activity is located along the coast of the island, many of the
power plants are located there as well. One reason is that the coast is flatter and
therefore it is cheaper to build there. Furthermore, proximity to coal sources for
thermal power plants is crucial. Coal in Indonesia is mostly available in the islands
7http://maps.library.leiden.edu/apps/search?code=04693focus
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of Sumatera and Kalimantan, which are easily reachable from the north coast be-
cause of proximity and good wave conditions in the Java sea. Furthermore, because
the coast is flatter, Kruskal’s algorithm will favor lines along the coast. It is then im-
portant to control for distance to coast in any empirical specification to avoid any
threats to exclusion.
Controlling for desa elevation is also necessary because it is correlated with distance
to hypothetical least coast grid. Another potential confounder is the possible corre-
lation between distance to the hypothetical grid and the road network in Java. For
that reason, controlling for distance to road is important to guarantee the exclusion
of the instrument. In all my specification, I control for the distance to the nearest
regional road. I also control for the availability of non-energy infrastructure facili-
ties. These include railway station, motor station, river pier, sea port, and airport. In
addition to geographic controls, I also control for the desa political status and legal
status. Political status is an indicator for whether the desa is the district capital. Le-
gal status of the village refers to whether the desa is governed by an elected official,
appointed official, or a traditional chief.
At the firm level, I control for whether the firm is public or private to deal with any
favoritism in access towards government owned firms. I also control for firm age,
legal status, and export status. The identification assumption is that, conditional on
controls, the potential outcomes of desas or firms are independent of their distance
to the hypothetical least cost grid.
To summarize, geographic desa controls include distance to coast, elevation, dis-
tance to nearest city, and distance to nearest road. Other desa level controls include
various infrastructure availability dummies, political status, and legal status. Firm
level controls include firm age, export status, legal status and ownership type.
2.5.2 Instrument Variation and Controls
Given that the instrument used to identify the causal effect of electrification is based
on geography, what variation is left in the distance to the hypothetical grid after con-
trolling for all geographic characteristics of desas? In other words, conditional on
local geography, why is it possible to still have two desas with different distances to
the hypothetical grid? The answer is because what matters for the hypothetical least
cost grid is global geography, not local geography. This is because the hypothetical
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least cost grid has the objective of minimizing the cost of building the transmission
grid, taking the location of the incumbent power plants as given. This is different to
using local geography to create the cheapest possible grid and predict access as in
Lipscomb, Mobarak, and Barham (2013) where the authors create a least cost grid,
including simulated locations of power plants, given the national budget. When
taking as given the location of actual power plants, the least cost algorithm will not
always choose the flatter areas because in some locations choosing a steeper path
might lead to a flatter path further ahead on route to the next power plant. This
creates variation in the distance to the hypothetical grid for locations with the same
local geographic characteristics.
2.5.3 Desa-Level First Stage
Figure 2.7 plots the unconditional probability of a desa having access to the grid as a
function of the distance to the hypothetical least cost grid. The closer a desa is to the
hypothetical grid, the more likely it is to have access to the actual grid. The relation-
ship between the probability of access to the actual grid and the instrument is neg-
ative. I also plot the median and 90th percentile of the instrument. At large values of
the instrument, i.e. for desas very far from the hypothetical, the instrument doesn’t
predict the probability of access very well. However, this is not much of a concern
as there are few observations in that region (beyond the 90th percentile). Figure 2.8
plots the probability of a desa having access to the grid for the years 1990, 1995 and
2000, against the distance to the hypothetical grid. The graph shows that the neg-
ative relationship between access and the instrument persists over time. Holding
distance to the hypothetical grid fixed, the probability of having access to the grid
is increasing over time. This captures the fact that the electricity grid was expanded
substantially between 1990 and 2000, increasing access from around 43% of Java’s
desas to 71%8.
8PLN reports an electrification ratio of 50% in 1990.
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The y-axis presents probability of a desa being connected to the grid, where Accessv pt is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if a desa is within 15 KM of the nearest transmission substation. The probability
is estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel function with a bandwidth of 2.16. The x-axis shows the
distance from the desa to the hypothetical least cost grid. The median and the 90th percentile of the
distance to the hypothetical grid are shown for reference.
33
CHAPTER 2. NEW DATA ON THE INDONESIAN ELECTRIFICATION
INFRASTRUCTURE AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY











0 20 40 60 80
Distance to LCN (KM)
 Probability of access 1990  Probability of access 1995
 Probability of access 2000
The y-axis presents probability of a desa being connected to the grid for years 1990, 1995 and 2000,
where Accessv pt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a desa is within 15 KM of the nearest transmission
substation. The probability is estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel function with a bandwidth
of 2.16. The x-axis shows the distance from the desa to the hypothetical least cost grid. The median
and the 90th percentile of the distance to the hypothetical grid are shown for reference.
Table 2.4 shows the first stage regression using distance to the hypothetical least cost
grid Z (K M) as an instrumental variable and using all the controls discussed above.
The dependent variable, Accessv pt , is an indicator variable equal to one if the desa
is within 15 KM9 of the nearest transmission substation in year t .
The coefficient in column (1) is negative and significant, indicating that the further
away a desa is from the hypothetical least cost network, the less likely it is to have
access to electricity. The first stage F-statistic is high enough to guarantee relevance
of the instrument, avoiding weak instrument bias. The coefficient in column (1)
then shows that even conditional on various controls, this difference in means is
still significant and distance to the hypothetical grid is a good predictor of access to
electricity at the desa level.
9This threshold was chosen based on conversations with electrical engineers at the Indonesian
state electricity monopoly. The results are not sensitive to this particular choice.
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Distance to city -0.00263***
(0.000131)



















Notes: First stage regression of access instrumented with distance to hypothetical least cost grid. Access is
defined at the desa level. A desa has Accessv pt = 1 if it is within 15 Km of the nearest substation. Desa con-
trols are defined at the desa level and include distance to coast, distance to nearest city, elevation, distance to
road, desa political status, and legal status, and infrastructure controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses
clustered at the desa level.
2.5.4 Instrument Validity
In this section, I present two exercises that test the validity of the hypothetical least
cost grid instrument. First, I create a placebo hypothetical least cost grid that con-
nects some random points in Java using the same least cost algorithm as the one
used in the main instrument (figure 2.5). If access to the grid is correlated with the
distance to this least cost placebo grid, it would mean that local geography, irre-
spective of the location of the actual electric transmission grid, is what is driving the
correlation between access and the instrument. Figure 2.9 illustrates the placebo
hypothetical least cost grid. The origin points to be connected by the algorithm
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were randomly chosen by the computer. The same algorithm applied to create the
hypothetical least cost network using the main incumbent power plants was applied
to connect these randomly generated points on a single network.
Figure 2.9: Placebo Least Cost Grid
The second test is based on a Euclidean or straight line version of the least cost grid
where instead of connecting the colonial power plants with least cost paths based
on geography, I connect them on a network of straight lines, ignoring geography.
This version of the hypothetical grid should alleviate any concerns that local geog-
raphy is what drives the correlation between the instrument and access to the grid
as opposed to the incumbent electric infrastructure. Figure 2.10 illustrates the hy-
pothetical Euclidean grid. The power plants connected by the straight lines are the
same as in the original hypothetical least cost grid. Each of the power plants was
connected to the closest power plant by a straight line, resulting in a single inter-
connected grid of straight lines.
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Figure 2.10: Hypothetical Euclidean Grid
Table 2.5 presents the results of the first stage regressions using these two alterna-
tive instruments. The first row shows the coefficient on the instrument, where in
each column a different instrument is used. For comparability, column (1) presents
again the first stage using the main instrument Z , the distance to the hypothetical
least cost grid.
Column (2) presents the results from the first stage regression of access on the placebo
instrument. There is no correlation between access to the grid and the distance to
the placebo grid and the estimated coefficient is very small and statistically indistin-
guishable from zero. The first stage F is close to zero. The coefficients on the control
variables remain more or less unchanged. The fact that access and distance to the
placebo grid are not correlated alleviates the concern that correlation between ac-
cess and the main instrument is purely driven by geography. The origin points of
the hypothetical least cost grid, or the incumbent infrastructure, plays an impor-
tant role in determining the correlation between access and Z .
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Finally, column (3) presents the first stage of access on the distance to the hypothet-
ical Euclidean grid. This grid only takes into account the origin points and abstracts
from geography. The coefficient on the instrument in column (3) shows that there
is a significant correlation between access and distant to the Euclidean grid. This is
reassuring because it suggests that the location of the main power plants is the main
driver of the strong first stage regression in the main empirical specification.
Table 2.5: First Stage Regressions-Validity
Dependent Variable Accessv pt
Instrument Z Placebo Euclidean
(1) (2) (3)
Instrument -0.00167*** 7.08e-05 -0.00153***
(0.000152) (0.000115) (0.000149)
Distance to city -0.00262*** -0.00330*** -0.00289***
(0.000131) (0.000118) (0.000124)
Distance to coast 5.95e-05 -6.33e-05 -0.000252*
(0.000149) (0.000147) (0.000145)
Elevation -0.191*** -0.210*** -0.214***
(0.00941) (0.00930) (0.00934)
Distance to road -0.00410*** -0.00492*** -0.00381***
(0.000662) (0.000633) (0.000668)
Motorstation -0.0316** -0.0334** -0.0307**
(0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0137)
Railway 0.0468** 0.0544*** 0.0462**
(0.0190) (0.0188) (0.0189)
Seaport -0.0575 -0.0565 -0.0488
(0.0536) (0.0542) (0.0555)
Airport 0.168*** 0.161*** 0.167***
(0.0423) (0.0429) (0.0423)
Riverpier 0.0256 0.0381 0.0351
(0.0446) (0.0452) (0.0454)
First Stage F 118.7 0.380 106.3
Observations 261,470 261,470 261,470
Year FE X X X
Desa Controls X X X
Province FE X X X
Notes: First stage regressions of access instrumented with distance to hypothetical least cost grid in column
(1), placebo least cost grid in column (2), and hypothetical Euclidean grid in column (3). Access is defined at
the desa level. A desa has Accessv pt = 1 if it is within 15 Km of the nearest substation. Desa controls are de-
fined at the desa level and include distance to coast, distance to nearest city, elevation, distance to road, desa
political status, and legal status, and infrastructure controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered
at the desa level.
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2.5.5 Firm-Level First Stage
Because part of the analysis in the subsequent chapters is at the firm level, and given
that firms are located in a subset of the desas, it is necessary to check whether my
empirical strategy is still valid at that level. I now check if distance to the hypothet-
ical least cost grid still explains access to electricity at the firm-level. In the current
section, I use the same definition of access, Accessv pt . This is an indicator is equal
to one if an firm is located in a desa within 15km of the nearest transmission substa-
tion. Based on the results from the previous section, firms are located in desas that
are on average closer to the hypothetical least cost grid. One concern is therefore
whether the instrument is still strong enough.
Figures 2.11 and 2.12 show again a negative relationship between the unconditional
probability of having access and distance to the least cost network, which is consis-
tent over time.
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The y-axis presents probability of a firm being in a desa with access to the grid, where Accessv pt is
a dummy variable equal to 1 if a desa is within 15 KM of the nearest transmission substation. The
probability is estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel function with a bandwidth of 2.49. The x-
axis shows the distance from the desa to the hypothetical least cost grid. The median and the 90th
percentile of the distance to the hypothetical grid are shown for reference.
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The y-axis presents probability of a firm being in a desa with access to the grid for years 1990, 1995
and 2000, where Accessv pt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a desa is within 15 KM of the nearest
transmission substation. The probability is estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel function with a
bandwidth of 2.49. The x-axis shows the distance from the desa to the hypothetical least cost grid.
The median and the 90th percentile of the distance to the hypothetical grid are shown for reference.
Column (1) of table 2.6 show the first stage regressions of access on zv t , the distance
to the hypothetical least cost grid. In addition to the above controls defined at the
desa-level, I include firm-level controls and year-by-industry fixed effects. The coef-
ficient in column (1) is negative and significant and the first stage F-statistic is high.
The instrument is therefore still relevant.
41
CHAPTER 2. NEW DATA ON THE INDONESIAN ELECTRIFICATION
INFRASTRUCTURE AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
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Notes: First stage regression of access instrumented with distance to hypothetical least cost grid.
Access is defined at the desa level. A desa has Accessv pt = 1 if it is within 15 Km of the nearest sub-
station. Desa controls are defined at the desa level and include distance to coast, distance to nearest
city, elevation, distance to road, desa political status, and legal status, and infrastructure controls.
Firm Controls include export, cohort, and ownership dummies. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses clustered at the desa level.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I presented the data on the expansion of the electric transmission
grid that I have collected as part of this project. This unique data on the electrifi-
cation infrastructure in Indonesia, combined with rich manufacturing census data,
allow me to evaluate the effect of electrification on industrial development.
In order to estimate the causal effect of electrification on industrial outcomes, I have
designed an empirical strategy that exploits a supply-side natural experiment based
on the need of a single interconnected transmission grid on the island of Java. I
build a hypothetical least cost transmission grid as a function of incumbent colo-
nial electric infrastructure and geographic cost factors. This hypothetical grid is the
basis of the empirical strategy applied in the following chapters. I start by looking at




Figure 2.13: Example of Inventory Table of Transmission Transformers.
Inventory table of operating transmission transformers in the Java-Bali transmission network, April
2001. This table corresponds to the Madiun sub-grid and includes information on the voltage, brand,
capacity, origin and destination of the connection, and operation year. Source: PLN.
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Figure 2.14: Example of current maps of the transmission network in Java.




Lampiran 6.3 (b) West Java20
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Lampiran 6.5 (d) East Java20
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Lampiran 6.6
Source: Electricity Supply Business Plan (RUPTL) 2006-2015, PLN
2.B Demand Forecasts
2.B.1 Methodology Overview: DKL
The model combines multiple methods; mainly trend projections and estimating
elasticities using OLS (referred to as the econometric model by PLN). PLN conducts
its forecast at the sectoral level before aggregating at the regional level. In the case
of Java, the forecast is aggregated at the system level. PLN considers four sectors:
Residential, Commercial, Public and Industrial. For each of these sectors, energy
consumption is forecasted as a function of historical PLN data, macroeconomic
variables, and elasticities of energy sales in that sector with respect to economic
growth.
2.B.2 Residential Sector
• Energy Consumed: E Rt = E Rt−1∗ (1+²Rt ∗ g t )+∆N bRt ∗U K Rt where:
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– ²Rt is the elasticity of residential energy sales (kWh) with respect to re-
gional GDP growth. Elasticities are obtained using the econometric model
where they calculate the elasticity either by using actual yearly data or by
regressing log sales on log gdp.
– g t is the regional GDP growth rate. This is either taken from BPS the
Indonesian Statistics Bureau or projected linearly.
– ∆N bRt is the change in the number of residential customers between year
t and year t−1. For future years, it is the change in the forecasted number
of customers between two years. The number of customers is projected
linearly using customer factor (the equivalent of elasticity) and popula-
tion growth rates where C F Rt is calculated as the elasticity of the number
of customers with respect to economic growth10.
– N bRt =N bRt−1∗ (1+C F Rt ∗ g t )
– U K Rt is energy consumption per customer (kWh/hh). The customer is
one household.
• In order to forecast electrification ratios, the future number of households in
the economy is forecasted using population forecasts and average number
of individuals per household and then used with the forecasted number of
customers to calculate the implied electrification ratio.
2.B.3 Commercial, Industrial and Public Sectors
Similarly, for each sector i , the goal is to get an estimate of energy consumption.
This is done as follows: the number of customers is calculated/projected:
• Energy Consumed: E it = E it−1∗ (1+²it ∗ g t ) where:
– ²it is the elasticity of energy sales (kWh) in sector i with respect to re-
gional GDP growth.
– g t is the regional GDP growth rate.
• In order to forecast power contracted, average power (VA) per customer is
multiplied by the number of new customers in sector, then it is added to the
previous year’s power contracted:
• PC it = PC it−1+∆N bit ∗U K
10PLN assumes elasticities if the calculated ones are unreasonable.
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• ∆N bit the change in the number of customers between year t and year t−1 in
sector i
• N bRt =N bRt−1∗ (1+C F Rt ∗ g t )
• U K it is energy consumption per customer (kWh/hh) which is the average from
historical data.
2.B.4 Forecasted Total Demand and Load Factor
• Total Energy Sales (GWh): ESt = E Rt +ECt +E Pt +E It
• Forecasted energy sales represent the energy needs of PLN customers
• Required energy production (GWh) needs to take account of inefficiencies
such as transmission and distribution losses (L%) and station use(SU%):
Pt = ESt(1−L−SU )
• The final form of demand forecast is called peak load (MW). To calculate that
from required production, the load factor is needed:

















Because the Java-Bali system is interconnected, forecast is done at the system level.
Figure 2.15 shows an example of a demand forecast table for the next 10 years done
in 1992 by PLN. The next step is to disaggregate this forecast at the substation level.
The way this is done is by looking at the proportion of the load borne by each substa-
tion out of the whole system load, and assuming that in the future these proportions
will be the same. Then divide the forecasted load according to each substation’s pro-
portion. Once the load forecast is calculated for each substation, it is then compared
to the capacity of each substation. If the load is greater than 80% of the capacity,
then the substation should be extended or a new substation is commissioned.
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Figure 2.15: Example of a Demand Forecast Table.




Effect of Electrification on Local
Industry
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I examine the effect of electrification on desa-level industrial out-
comes. I investigate what happens to manufacturing activity in the desa when the
grid arrives by looking at the number of manufacturing firms, number of workers in
manufacturing, and manufacturing output in section 3.2.
In order to understand the mechanisms through which electrification affects local
industry, I look at how firm turnover, as measured by the entry and exit rates of
firms, is affected by electrification in section 3.3. A change in firm turnover could
mean that electrification is changing the composition of firms in the industry by af-
fecting barriers to entry. By focusing on the extensive margin of electrification (grid
expansion), the aim is therefore to see whether electrification has any effect of the
extensive margin of industrialization (firm entry and exit).
Finally, an important question that arises in any spacial analysis is whether elec-
trification creates new industrial activity or it reorganizes industrial activity across
space. I address this question by conducting various empirical tests in section 3.4.
3.2 Electrification and Local Industrial Outcomes
I examine whether the expansion of the grid affected the number of firms, manufac-
turing employment and manufacturing output at the desa level. To this end, I use
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the data-set of all desas in Java between 1990 and 2000 which I described in chapter
2. To recap, I superimpose the firm-level data on a digital map of desas in Java to
get the number of firms per desa per year, as well as number of workers in manu-
facturing, and industrial output. I combine that with data desa-level characteristics
including non-energy infrastructure and geography variables. The resulting data-
set is a balanced panel of 24,824 desas over 11 years.
3.2.1 Desa-Level Manufacturing Outcomes
The three columns of table 3.1 shows the OLS, IV and reduced-form regression re-
sults for three desa-level outcomes as in specification (2.1): number of firms, total
number of workers in the manufacturing sector, and total manufacturing output.
Because I have many desas that don’t have any medium or large manufacturing
firm, hence many zero values, I use the level of these variables instead of the log
(See table 3.7 in the appendix for results with zero-preserving log transformations).
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Table 3.1: Impact of access on desa level outcomes.
Sample: Desa-Level
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable No of Firms No of Workers Output
in Manufacturing Billion IDR
Panel A: OLS
Accessv pt 0.378*** 74.64*** 3.973***
(0.0288) (6.196) (0.491)
Panel B: IV
Accessv pt 0.887* 513.9*** 39.74***
(0.480) (113.8) (8.175)
First Stage F 118.7 118.7 118.7
Panel C: Reduced Form IV
Z (KM) -0.00148* -0.856*** -0.0662***
(0.000793) (0.176) (0.0125)
Observations 261,470 261,470 261,470
Year FE X X X
Province FE X X X
Geo Controls X X X
Mean Dep Var 0.84 110 6.7
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from OLS, IV and reduced-form regressions of equation (2.1). Geographic controls
are defined at the desa level and include distance to coast, distance to nearest city, elevation, dis-
tance to road, desa political and legal status, and infrastructure controls. Robust standard errors in
parentheses clustered at the desa level.
Across all outcome variables, the OLS estimates in Panel A are positive and signifi-
cant, suggesting that there is a positive correlation between access to electricity and
industrial outcomes. Compared to the IV estimates in Panel B, OLS is consistently
smaller in magnitude. This result is in line with the infrastructure literature both
on electrification (e.g. Dinkelman (2011), and Lipscomb, Mobarak, and Barham
(2013)) and transport (Baum-Snow (2007), Duranton and Turner (2012), and Du-
ranton, Morrow, and Turner (2014)) indicating that infrastructure is allocated to less
productive areas. This means that the OLS estimates will underestimate the effect
of electrification on manufacturing, as the results show. However, the difference in
magnitude between the OLS and the IV estimates is surprisingly large. Before dis-
cussing potential reasons in section 3.2.2, I first turn to the interpretation of the IV
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estimates.
The IV estimates in Panel B are positive and significant. The coefficient in column
(1) in panel B says that the causal effect of grid access on the number of firms in a
desa is an increase of 0.9 firm. Considering that the average number of firms per
desa in the sample is 0.84, this effect is large and around 100% increase over the
average. Theoretically, a larger number of firms is associated with a tougher com-
petition. Therefore, electrification potentially intensifies competition by increasing
the number of active producers.
Similarly for the number of workers and manufacturing output, the IV estimates in
columns (2) and (3) are positive, large and strongly significant. A caveat is that I don’t
observe the universe of manufacturing firms, but instead I observe the universe of
medium and large manufacturing firms with 20 or more employees. To mitigate
this issue, for the number of firms, I use the reported start year of production in the
survey as opposed to the first year I observe the firm in the data. I take that into ac-
count when calculating the total number of firms in a desa which greatly alleviates
this issue.1 As for the total number of workers in manufacturing and manufacturing
output, I don’t observe any information for these firms before they are in the sur-
vey. Therefore coefficients in panel B columns (2) and (3) should be interpreted as
the causal difference in the number of workers and manufacturing output between
electrified and non-electrified desas with Medium and Large manufacturing firms.
Panel C of table 3.1 presents the reduced-form regressions from regressing desa out-
comes on the instrument, distance to the hypothetical grid. Coefficients in columns
(1), (2) and (3) all show the closer a desa is to the least cost network, the larger the
number of firms, number of manufacturing workers and manufacturing output.
Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate this negative relationship (unconditional) and show
the kernel regression of the of number of manufacturing firms, number of workers
and manufacturing output as a function of the distance to the hypothetical least
cost grid. The relationship between each of these desa-level outcome variables and
the distance to the hypothetical grid is negative, illustrating the reduced-form effect
of the instrument on the outcome variables.
1Of course, I still don’t observe those firms that exited before they reached the threshold to be
included in the survey. This is however not a major concern as these firm are naturally small both in
number of workers and probably in production relative to the total manufacturing sector.
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The y-axis presents the number of manufacturing firms at the desa level as a function of the distance
of that desa to the hypothetical least cost grid. This is estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel func-
tion with a bandwidth of 2.42. The x-axis shows the distance from the desa to the hypothetical least
cost grid. The median and the 90th percentile of the distance to the hypothetical grid are shown for
reference.
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The y-axis presents the number of manufacturing workers at the desa level as a function of the dis-
tance of that desa to the hypothetical least cost grid. This is estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel
function with a bandwidth of 3.35. The x-axis shows the distance from the desa to the hypothetical
least cost grid. The median and the 90th percentile of the distance to the hypothetical grid are shown
for reference.
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The y-axis presents the manufacturing output (Billion IDR) at the desa level as a function of the dis-
tance of that desa to the hypothetical least cost grid. This is estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel
function with a bandwidth of 5.02. The x-axis shows the distance from the desa to the hypothetical
least cost grid. The median and the 90th percentile of the distance to the hypothetical grid are shown
for reference.
3.2.2 Magnitude of Estimated Coefficients.
The direction of the OLS bias I find is common in the infrastructure literature as dis-
cussed in the previous section. However, the difference in magnitudes between the
IV estimates and the OLS estimate is rather large, and calls for a discussion. I will
present and discuss four potential reasons for this difference.
The first and most concerning reason is a violation of the exclusion restriction. The
validity of any instrumental variable strategy rests on the assumption that the in-
strument is excluded, meaning that the instrument only affects the outcome vari-
able through its effect on the endogenous treatment variable. In this setting, this
means that the distance to the hypothetical grid, conditional on controls, only af-
fects industrial outcomes through its effect on access to the actual grid. Unfortu-
nately this assumption cannot be directly tested and we would have to rely on eco-
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nomic reasoning to understand how likely it is that there is a violation. There are
largely two types of variables that could affect both the distance to the hypotheti-
cal least cost grid and industrial outcomes. The first is other types of infrastructure
such as access to roads. The second group is local geography. To ensure that the
exclusion restriction is not violated, I include an extensive set of controls for both
types of variables in all empirical specifications, as outlined in the first chapter of
this thesis. In addition to geographic and infrastructure controls, I also control for
other political and economic characteristics. The results from section 2.5.4 in chap-
ter 2 with the placebo grid and the Euclidean grid alleviate this concern and show
that local geography does not drive the correlation between access and the distance
to the least cost grid.
To test whether there are other time-invariant factors that could be driving the cor-
relation between the instrument and access, I run specification (2.1) again but in-
cluding desa-level fixed effects:
Yv pt =α+βAccessv pt +ηVv pt +γd +δpt +²v pt (3.1)
where γd is the desa fixed effect and δpt is a province-by-year fixed effect.
Since the instrument is also time-invariant, I interact it with year dummies. The
variation used here is different than in table 3.1: when instrumenting the the dis-
tance to the hypothetical grid interacted with year dummies, I exploit time variation
in how the instrument explains access. I still include all the time-varying desa-level
controls as before. Results are presented in table 3.2. As before, the OLS estimates
in panel A are downward biased. The IV estimates in panel B show that electrifi-
cation causes industrial outcomes to increase. Panel C presents the reduced form
regression of outcomes on the instrument Z interacted with time dummies. The
coefficients indicate that the closer a desa is to the hypothetical least cost grid, the
more industrial activity it has, and this relationship is consistent over time.
Given this rich set of controls and the evidence from the various empirical tests pre-
sented in this chapter and the previous chapter, it is unlikely that a violation of the
exclusion restriction is driving the difference in magnitudes between the IV and OLS
estimates.
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Table 3.2: Impact of access on desa level outcomes - fixed effects.
Sample: Desa-Level
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable No of Firms No of Workers Output
in Manufacturing Billion IDR
Panel A: OLS
Accessv pt -0.0450*** -6.532* -2.812***
(0.0112) (3.829) (0.571)
Panel B: IV
Accessv pt 3.010*** 942.2*** 127.4***
(0.338) (113.3) (16.20)
First Stage F 73.83 73.83 73.83
Panel C: Reduced Form IV
Zx1991 -0.000926*** -0.389*** -0.0132***
(9.21e-05) (0.0443) (0.00238)
Zx1992 -0.00151*** -0.623*** -0.0325***
(0.000148) (0.0671) (0.00479)
Zx1993 -0.00194*** -0.731*** -0.0637***
(0.000182) (0.0901) (0.0223)
Zx1994 -0.00250*** -0.911*** -0.0600***
(0.000226) (0.0950) (0.00927)
Zx1995 -0.00326*** -0.903*** -0.0853***
(0.000283) (0.227) (0.0124)
Zx1996 -0.00386*** -1.287*** -0.0751***
(0.000335) (0.117) (0.0106)
Zx1997 -0.00410*** -1.279*** -0.0870***
(0.000379) (0.128) (0.0116)
Zx1998 -0.00417*** -1.222*** -0.258***
(0.000428) (0.129) (0.0319)
Zx1999 -0.00461*** -1.328*** -0.313***
(0.000452) (0.137) (0.0433)
Zx2000 -0.00513*** -1.468*** -0.390***
(0.000483) (0.151) (0.0498)
Observations 261,470 261,470 261,470
Desa FE X X X
ProvinceYear FE X X X
Geo Controls X X X
Mean Dep Var 0.84 110 6.7
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from OLS, IV and reduced-form regressions of equation (3.1). Geographic controls
are defined at the desa level and include distance to coast, distance to nearest city, distance to road,
desa political and legal status, and infrastructure controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses
clustered at the desa level.
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The second possible reason is a technical one that is somewhat common in two-
stage least square (2SLS) strategies with a binary endogenous variable, access in
this case. If the first stage of the 2SLS estimation gives predicted values for the bi-
nary endogenous variable that are outside the [0,1] range, then this could lead to
inflated second stage coefficients. This is not the case in this paper, where the 1st
and the 98th percentiles of the predicted values in the first stage are between 0 and
12.
The third reason, which is the most likely reason, is a compliers’ issue. Given that
I am estimating a local average treatment effect of access on industrial outcomes;
this difference in magnitudes is potentially driven by a complier sub-population of
desas that would benefit more from electrification. For instance, is it possible that
compliers are different from the average electrified desa in Java. This is because the
decision to electrify a desa is affected by political and socioeconomic conditions.
Complier desas are those desas that get access to the grid because the cost of ex-
tending the grid to them is low, and not because of confounding political, economic,
or social reasons. Given that the compliance of these desas is based on the low cost
of electricity provision, it may well be that these desas will experience higher returns
to electrification. Second, the compliers in my empirical strategy are more likely to
have firms in more electricity intensive industries, and these industries would nat-
urally benefit more from electrification.
The fourth possible reason is measurement error. Measurement error in the access
variable could lead to an attenuation bias in the estimated OLS coefficient. I am not
able to rule this out, especially that the access definition in this chapter is a rough
one. However, results from the firm-level analysis in the next chapter, where I use
a more accurate definition of access and still get a large difference between IV and
OLS estimates, indicate that measurement error is unlikely to be severe in this case.
Now that I have discussed reasons for the large difference between OLS and IV esti-
mates, it is important to ask whether the IV estimates are sensible. In other words,
are the IV estimates too large, irrespective of how they compare to the OLS esti-
mates? Looking at the bottom two rows of table 3.1, it is clear that the unconditional
average number of firms is low. This is driven by the fact that many desas have zero
firms. Conditional on having a positive number of firms (bottom row), the effect of
2Source: author’s calculation.
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access on the number of workers in manufacturing and manufacturing output do
not appear so large. In fact, the estimated IV coefficients for these variables is simi-
lar to the difference between desas that have zero firms and the average desa with a
positive number of firms. Therefore, the effect of electrification on local industry is
comparable to and could be interpreted as moving from a desa with no firms to the
average industrialized desa.
3.3 Electrification and Firm Turnover
The availability of the grid in a desa may affect the attractiveness of this particular
desa to entrepreneurs who are considering to start a firm. As shown in section 3.2,
electrification causes the total number of firms in a desa to increase. I now investi-
gate the role of entry and exit as drivers of this increase.
Columns (1) and (2) of table 3.3 look at the effect of access on firm turnover. The first
outcome is entry rate, defined as the ratio of entrants to the total number of firms.
The second outcome variable is the exit rate, defined as the ratio of exiting firms to
the total number of firms. These outcomes are only defined for desas with a positive
number of firms. As before, the OLS estimates in panel A are positive and smaller
in magnitude than the IV estimates in panel B, and are therefore downward biased.
Focusing on panel B, the IV estimate in column (1) show that access to the grid in-
creases firm entry rate by around 10%. Interestingly, in column (2), the coefficient
on access shows that the exit rate also increases due to electrification, although by
a smaller amount than the entry rate. This is consistent with the an increase in the
total number of manufacturing firms from column (1) in table 3.1. Electrification
therefore increases firm turnover, leading to more churning in a given desa. Higher
churning is a sign of efficiency where firm selection into and out of the desa is at
work.
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Table 3.3: Impact of access on desa level turnover.
Sample: Desa-Level
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable Entry Rate Exit Rate
Panel A: OLS
Accessv pt 0.00719*** 0.00171***
(0.00263) (0.000581)
Panel B: IV
Accessv pt 0.106*** 0.0157**
(0.0284) (0.00658)
First Stage F 58.39 58.39
Panel C: Reduced Form IV
Z (KM) -0.000249*** -3.68e-05**
(6.00e-05) (1.50e-05)
Observations 54,210 54,210
Year FE X X
Province FE X X
Geo Controls X X
Mean Dep Var 0.07 0.01
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from OLS, IV and reduced-form regressions of equation (2.1). Geographic controls
are defined at the desa level and include distance to coast, distance to nearest city, elevation, dis-
tance to road, desa political and legal status, and infrastructure controls. Robust standard errors in
parentheses clustered at the desa level.
These findings suggest that the extensive margin of electrification induces long-run
firm responses; entry and exit. Interpreting the results in this section, the extensive
margin of electrification therefore affects the extensive margin of industrialization,
or firm entry, by increasing entry rates. In a competitive environment, more entry
can lead to more exit as relatively unproductive incumbents will be less likely to
survive. Therefore, electrification also increases exit rates.
3.4 Electrification and Relocation of Industrial Activity
The results in the previous section indicate that electrification increases industrial
activity at the desa-level by attracting more firms. To learn about the aggregate ef-
fect of electrification, one important question is thus whether these firms are new
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firms or whether they are firms that have relocated from other non-electrified desas.
In particular, it is interesting to understand if these firms would have existed any-
way, regardless of electrification. In the case where firms would relocate, the effect
of electrification would be a reorganization of economic activity across the island as
opposed to creation of new economic activity; meaning that the aggregate effect of
electrification is small or negligible.
Put differently, a potential concern is that the stable unit treatment value assump-
tion (SUTVA) is violated in the identification strategy in this analysis. SUTVA re-
quires that the treatment applied to one unit does not affect the outcome for an-
other unit. If electrifying one desa (or firm) will create firm relocation or business
stealing for competitors (because of lower prices), then SUTVA is violated. The pres-
ence of these spillovers across different desas complicates the interpretation of my
results. Electrifying one desa can have an effect on firms in other desas, and these
effects are likely to be negative. What I estimate as the average difference between
electrified and non-electrified desas could be therefore a combination of creation of
new economic activity and displacement of economic activity from those that don’t
get electrified (or are already electrified) to desas that get newly electrified.
In the following subsections, I attempt to address the question of whether electrifi-
cation creates new economic activity or whether it is relocating economic activity. I
start by looking at the possibility of firm relocation.
3.4.1 Relocation of Incumbent Firms
Can electrifying a new desa induce firms in non-electrified desas to close their fac-
tories and move them to the newly electrified desa? This could happen if a firm
finds in profitable to do so, i.e. when the cost of relocation is smaller than the ben-
efit of relocating. Firms choose to locate in certain desas presumably because the
benefits from being in that location are the highest for that particular firm (e.g. local
knowledge, home bias, etc.), so moving would be costly, in addition to the physical
relocation costs.
Unlike a network of highways or subways, access to the electrification infrastructure
is not restricted to particular locations such as a train station or a highway entrance.
There is no technological limit on where the grid can go. In the context the island
of Java, even if a desa is faraway from the grid at a certain point in time, it will even-
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tually be connected to the grid. Given that this is a period of rapid expansion of the
grid in Java, eventually all desas became connected to the grid. So unless the firm is
really impatient, the benefit of moving to an electrified desa today versus waiting to
get access in the future is unlikely to be a profitable action. Confirming this insight,
I observe no firm movements across desas in the dataset3,4.
Finally, the evidence from desa-level regressions in table 3.3 column (2) shows that
there is more exit in electrified desas. If firms were shutting down their factories in
non-electrified desas and moving them to electrified desas, then the exit rates would
be higher in non-electrified desas. Results show the opposite. This result on exit
rates is thus evidence against exit of firms from non-electrified desas to electrified
desas.
3.4.2 Empirical Tests
To test whether relocation of firms is important in this context, I perform three main
empirical tests. Given the technology argument made above and the rapid grid ex-
pansion, relocation is likely to happen at a local geographic level where the benefits
from being in different desas are comparable within a certain proximity. This argu-
ment applies both to incumbent firms as well as entrants. In fact, it is expected for
these local spillover effects to be larger for entrants since these do not need to incur
a physical cost of relocation.
First, I estimate equation (2.1) at the district5-level, a higher administrative division
than a desa6. If spillovers are prominent, then the estimates should be smaller at the
district-level. Table 3.4 presents the OLS and IV results. For comparability with the
desa-level results in table 3.1, I use the average number of firms, average number of
manufacturing workers and average manufacturing output in a district as opposed
to the total7 in columns (1), (2) and (3) as the dependent variables. In columns (4)
3Less that 5% of the firms change desas between 1990-2000. I exclude these firms from the analy-
sis.
4Another possibility is that entrepreneurs could be closing their factories in non-electrified desas
and opening new factories producing different products in electrified desas. In this case, the firm
will show up with a new firm identifier in the data, and it will be counted it as an exiting firm from
the non-electrified desa and a new entry in the electrified desa. However, since I don’t observe the
identity of the owners, it is not possible for me to track this firm. Given that it is producing a different
product, it wouldn’t be unreasonable to consider this firm as a new firm.
5Kecamatan in Bahasa
6The average number of desas per district is 16.
7Results are similar when using the total then dividing by average number of desas in a district.
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and (5), I present the results for the entry and exit rates, defined as the total number
of entrants and exiting firms divided by the total number of firms at the district-
level, respectively. Comparing to the desa-level results, the effect of access on these
industrial outcomes at the district level is very close to the effect at the desa-level.
The estimated coefficients are if anything somewhat larger that the estimated coef-
ficients from table 3.1, meaning that relocation of economic activity within district
is unlikely. The IV results in Panel B therefore confirm that spillovers or relocation
of economic activity are not prominent in this context.
Table 3.4: Impact of access on district level outcomes.
Sample: District-Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable No. of Firms No. of Workers Output Entry Exit
in Manufacturing Billion IDR Rate Rate
Panel A: OLS
Accessd t 0.447*** 3.312*** 85.95*** 0.00738* 0.00254***
(0.0716) (0.818) (13.51) (0.00395) (0.000756)
Panel B: IV
Accessd t 1.616* 39.05*** 617.5*** 0.101*** 0.0143*
(0.846) (13.43) (229.6) (0.0367) (0.00737)
First Stage F 20.12 20.12 20.12 19.73 19.73
Observations 17,941 17,941 17,941 13,407 13,407
Year FE X X X X X
Province FE X X X X X
Geo Controls X X X X X
Mean Dep Var 1.08 153 8.9 0.072 0.009
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from OLS, and IV regressions of equation (2.1) at the district level. Geographic controls are defined
at the district level and include distance to coast, distance to nearest city, elevation, distance to road, desa political
and legal status, and infrastructure controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the district level. Ac-
cess is defined as a dummy equal to 1 if at least 50% of desas in the district are within 15Km of the closest substation.
Second, I test if an increase in the number of neighboring desas that switch from
being non-electrified to electrified in a certain year negatively affects the number of
firms and the number of entrants in desas that are not electrified and that remain
so. If there are any relocation effects, I would be expect them to be largest for this
sub-sample.
I run the following specification where I test the effect of N Sv pt , the number of switch-
ing neighboring desas on desa outcome Yv pt , conditional on the total number of
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neighboring desas Nv p defined as the number of desas within a 7 km radius of the
desa.
Yv pt =α+βN Sv pt +θNv p +µZv p +ηVv pt +γp +δt +²v pt (3.2)
Of course, N Sv pt is endogenous. I instrument N
S
v pt with the average distance of
neighboring desas to the hypothetical grid8, conditional on the desa’s distance to
the least cost hypothetical grid Zv p .
8Variation in the shape of the grid across space means that the average neighbors distance to the
grid and the desa’s own distance to the grid are not perfectly collinear. Interacting the IV with time
dummies also helps with power.
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Table 3.5: Relocation of Economic Activity Desa-Level
Sample: Desa-Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable No of Firms No of Entrants Entry Rate Exit Rate
Panel A: OLS
NSv pt 0.0082 -0.000199 -0.00035 -9.5e-05
(0.0051) (0.00033) (0.00049) (8.45e-05)
Nv p 0.0097*** 0.00066*** -0.000160 -3e-05
(0.00132) (0.000104) (0.000104) (2.00e-05)
Z(KM) -0.00019 -3.2e-06 -0.0002* 2.9e-06
(0.000814) (6.82e-05) (0.000106) (2.10e-05)
Panel B: IV
NSv pt -0.0177 0.00349 0.000424 -0.00114
(0.0135) (0.00349) (0.00363) (0.0008)
Nv p 0.0101*** 0.00061*** -0.0002 -8e-06
(0.00135) (9.60e-05) (0.000129) (2.66e-05)
Z(KM) -0.00019 -4.31e-06 -0.000203* 5e-06
(0.00081) (6.8e-05) (0.0001) (2e-05)
First Stage F 40.60 40.60 12.44 12.44
Observations 113,312 113,312 15,446 15,446
Year FE X X X X
Province FE X X X X
Geo Controls X X X X
Mean Dep Var 0.39 0.03 0.08 0.006
Mean NSv pt 0.38 0.38 0.53 0.53
Mean Nv t 35 35 42 42
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from OLS, and IV regressions of equation (3.2). Geographic controls are defined at
the desa level and include distance to coast, distance to nearest city, elevation, distance to road, desa
political and legal status, and infrastructure controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses clus-
tered at the desa level.
Table 3.5 shows the OLS and IV results for this first test. Panel B column (1) shows
the IV estimate for the effect of an increase in the number of switching neighbors
on the number of firms in the desa. The coefficient is statistically indistinguishable
from zero and is small in magnitude. Give the mean number of switching neighbors
in a given year for a given desa, this says that when one neighbor gets electricity in
a certain year, the number of firms decreases by 0.007 firms; approximately zero.
The coefficient in Panel B column (2) shows the same IV regression for the number
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of entrants. The estimated effect is small and insignificant, but also positive. This
shows that if a neighboring desas gets electrified, that does not decrease the num-
ber of entrants in the non electrified desa. Columns (3) and (4) panel B show the IV
estimates for entry and exit rates. Results indicate that there is no effect of switching
neighbors on firm turnover. In the appendix to this chapter, section 3.A, I show the
same test in table 3.8 for the sub-sample restricting the sample to positive number
of switching neighbors, where the effects should be larger. The results are similar
and do not show any evidence for local spillovers.
Finally, I repeat the desa-level analysis from equation (2.1) but jointly estimating the
main effect of access Accessv pt and the spillover effect NCv pt . N
C
v pt is defined as the
number of connected neighboring desas. I also condition on the total number of
neighboring desas Nv p .
Yv pt =α+βAccessv pt +µNCv pt +θNv p +ηVv pt +γp +δt +²v pt (3.3)
The coefficient on NCv pt will therefore measure the effect of having an additional
electrified neighboring desa on desa outcome Yv pt . If βˆ and µˆ∗ ¯NCv pt sum up to
zero, where ¯NCv pt is the average number of connected neighboring desas, then the
effect of electrification evaluated at the average number of connected neighbors is
only a relocation one. Otherwise, if the sum of βˆ and µˆ∗ ¯NCv pt is larger than zero,
then electrification creates new economic activity. As before, I instrument access
with the desa’s own distance to the hypothetical grid, and the number of connected
neighbors by the average distance of neighbors to the hypothetical grid, both inter-
acted with time dummies to aid with power.
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Table 3.6: Access and spillover effects at the desa-level.
Sample: Desa-Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable No. of Firms No. of Workers Output Entry Exit
in Manufacturing Billion IDR Rate Rate
Panel A: OLS
Accessv pt 0.234*** 21.03 2.816** 0.00959** -0.00033
(0.0577) (13.46) (1.170) (0.00395) (0.0009)
NCv pt 0.0014 1.607*** 0.049 -3.8e-05 4.9e-05***
(0.00161) (0.389) (0.0357) (7.6e-05) (1.8e-05)
Nv p 0.00804*** -0.621*** -0.0620*** -8.2e-05 -8.4e-06
(0.00134) (0.190) (0.0125) (7.6e-05) (1.7e-05)
Panel B: IV
Accessv pt 2.001** 545.3** 100.7*** 0.152*** 0.031**
(0.886) (222.5) (19.68) (0.053) (0.0148)
NCv pt -0.0318 -6.407 -2.916*** -0.002** -0.0007***
(0.0249) (5.775) (0.555) (0.001) (0.0003)
Nv p 0.0277 3.617 1.998*** 0.00127* 0.0006***
(0.0172) (3.982) (0.389) (0.00076) (0.0002)
First Stage F 39.63 39.63 39.63 5.078 5.078
Observations 261,470 261,470 261,470 54,210 54,210
Year FE X X X X X
Province FE X X X X X
Geo Controls X X X X X
Mean Dep Var 0.84 110 6.7 0.07 0.01
Mean NCv pt 27.8 27.8 27.8 39.6 39.6
Mean Nv t 43 43 43 52 52
P-value of joint effect 0.0016 0.00 0.011 0.0013 0.17
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from OLS and IV regressions of equation (3.3). Geographic controls are defined at the desa level and
include distance to coast, distance to nearest city, elevation, distance to road, desa political and legal status, and in-
frastructure controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the desa level. The p-value in the last row
corresponds to the null of H0: βˆ+27.8∗ µˆ= 0.
Table 3.6 presents the OLS and IV results of equation (3.3). Focusing on the IV results
in panel B, the estimated coefficients across all industrial outcomes are comparable
to the IV results in table 3.1. The effect of access on industrial outcomes is positive
and significant. On the other hand, the IV estimate for the effect of the number
of connected neighbors NCv pt is small and negative, but not always significant. It is
significant only in columns (3), (4) and (5). This indicates that spillovers are stronger
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in the output market, consistent with high relocation costs of firms and workers.
The last row of table 3.6 presents the p-value of the joint test where the null is H0 :
βˆ+µˆ∗ ¯NCv pt = 0. The null is rejected in columns (1) to (4). This indicates that indeed
electrification does create new economic activity, and the effects are not restricted
to relocation of economic activity.
3.5 Conclusion
I find that electrification causes industrial activity to increase in the desa, man-
ifested by an increase in the number of manufacturing firms, workers in manu-
facturing, and manufacturing output. Highlighting the economic mechanism in
play, I show that electrification increases entry rates, but also exit rates. Electrifi-
cation therefore increases firm turnover, a potential sign of a healthier market al-
location mechanism where there is tougher competition in the market. I find that
the increase in industrialization at the desa-level is mostly due to the creation of
new manufacturing activity rather than a reorganization of economic activity across
space.
An important conclusion from the empirical analysis in this chapter is that the ex-
tensive margin of electrification driven by the expansion of the grid is a significant
driver of industrialization. Electrification leads to the creation of new firms, which
in turns forces inefficient incumbents to exit. Uncovering this economic mecha-
nism - firm turnover - is informative for policy: it clarifies when and how electri-
fication can lead to industrial development. It also implies that if there are other
significant non-energy barriers to entry that prevent extensive margin effects of in-




Table 3.7: Impact of electrification on desa level industrial outcomes - Log transfor-
mations.
Sample: Desa-Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(1+N) Log(h(N)) Log(1+W) Log(h(W)) Log(1+Y) Log(h(Y))
Panel A: OLS
Accessv pt 0.103*** 0.131*** 0.329*** 0.368*** 0.126*** 0.149***
(0.00553) (0.00699) (0.0171) (0.0193) (0.00611) (0.00725)
Panel B: IV
Accessv pt 0.210** 0.266** 0.918*** 0.961*** 0.774*** 0.906***
(0.0983) (0.125) (0.307) (0.346) (0.125) (0.147)
First Stage F 118.7 118.7 118.7 118.7 118.7 118.7
Panel C: Reduced Form IV
Z (KM) -0.000350** -0.000443** -0.00153*** -0.00160*** -0.00129*** -0.00151***
(0.000162) (0.000206) (0.000500) (0.000566) (0.000181) (0.000214)
Observations 261,470 261,470 261,470 261,470 261,470 261,470
Year FE X X X X X X
Province FE X X X X X X
Geo Controls X X X X X X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from OLS and IV and Reduced-Form regressions of two different measures of log transformations that
preserve zeros for the number of firms N , number of workers in manufacturing W and total manufacturing output Y .
The first transformation is a log (1+ X ). The second transformation is log (h(X )) where h(X ) = X + (X 2+1) 12 following
Liu and Qiu (2016). Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the desa level. Geographic controls are defined
at the desa level and include distance to coast, distance to nearest city, elevation, distance to road, desa political and le-
gal status, and infrastructure controls. Firm Controls include export, cohort, and ownership dummies. Robust standard
errors in parentheses clustered at the desa level.
69
CHAPTER 3. EFFECT OF ELECTRIFICATION ON LOCAL INDUSTRY
Table 3.8: Relocation of Economic Activity Desa-Level; Positive Number of Switch-
ing Neighbors.
Sample: Desa-Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable No of Firms No of Entrants Entry Rate Exit Rate
Panel A: OLS
NSv pt 0.0178** 5.59e-05 -0.000462 -8.16e-05
(0.00851) (0.000490) (0.000958) (0.000181)
Nv p 0.0107*** 0.000735*** -3.70e-05 1.60e-05
(0.00226) (0.000268) (0.000441) (9.51e-05)
Z(KM) 0.00481** 0.000108 8.38e-05 1.69e-06
(0.00221) (0.000210) (0.000667) (0.000146)
Panel B: IV
NSv pt 0.0211 0.00559 0.00513 -0.00109*
(0.0301) (0.00681) (0.00496) (0.000573)
Nv p 0.01000 -0.000452 -0.00130 0.000244
(0.00714) (0.00146) (0.00123) (0.000163)
Z(KM) 0.00486** 0.000196 0.000580 -8.81e-05
(0.00225) (0.000209) (0.000829) (0.000161)
First Stage F 8.309 8.309 5.556 5.556
Observations 4,636 4,636 706 706
Year FE X X X X
Province FE X X X X
Geo Controls X X X X
Mean Dep Var 0.42 0.02 0.07 0.006
Mean NSv pt 9.2 9.2 11.6 11.6
Mean Nv t 43 43 52 52
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from OLS, and IV regressions of equation (3.2), restricting the sample to those desas
with a positive number of switching neighbors. Geographic controls are defined at the desa level and
include distance to coast, distance to nearest city, elevation, distance to road, desa political and legal
status, and infrastructure controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the desa level.
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Chapter 4
Electrification and Firm Performance
4.1 Introduction
So far, results show that the expansion of the electricity grid caused an increase in
manufacturing activity and increased firm turnover in Java. Is this increase in man-
ufacturing due just to an increase in the number of manufacturing firm or is firm
size also affected by access? In other words, does electrification increase industrial
activity by attracting the same type of firms or are the firms in electrified areas are
different in terms of their performance? To answer this question, I make use of the
firm-level manufacturing census and I analyze the effect of access at the desa-level
on firm outcomes.
I start by looking at the effect of access on firm output and inputs. I then look at
whether firm survival is affected by access for consistency with the turnover results
from the previous chapter. Finally, I check if there are any business stealing effects
at the firm-level as a test of spillovers.
4.2 Electrification and Firm-Level Outcomes
In this section, I test how average firm performance measures respond to access to
electricity. I investigate whether firms in electrified desas are different. I begin by
looking at firm output and inputs. I then look at how electrification is affecting firm
turnover by looking at firm-level exit probabilities and the age distribution of firms.
If firm turnover is a mechanism through which electrification affects manufactur-
ing activity, the probability of exit would be higher and firms would be younger in
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electrified desas.
4.2.1 Output and Inputs
I first present the estimation results of specification (2.2) for different firm-level out-
come variables. Table 4.1 shows the OLS, IV and reduced-form versions of specifi-
cation (2.2) for the log values of firm-level deflated sales, deflated capital, wage bill,
number of workers, energy bill and quantity of electricity consumed in kWh. The
treatment variable here again is Accessv pt , instrumented with Zv , the distance to
the hypothetical least cost grid in kilometers. Table 4.1 panel A presents the OLS
results which indicate a positive relationship between average output and inputs
and access. The OLS estimates are smaller in magnitude that the IV estimates as
before. Panel B shows that electrification causes an increase in average firm out-
put and production inputs. The IV coefficients are all positive and significant at
the 1% level. Looking at the first column of Panel B, the causal effect of access on
average firm sales is large and positive. Columns (2) to (4) show that access also
causes firm input demand for capital and labor (wage bill and number of workers)
to increase substantially, with a larger effect on capital relative to labor. Perhaps
not surprisingly, the effect on the energy bill in columns (5), which include both
spending on electricity and fuels, is the largest. Column (6) shows that firms with
access to the grid do indeed consume a substantially greater quantity of electricity
in kWh. The fact that electricity consumed increases by more than the increase in
the energy bill reassuringly means that the unit price of electricity is lower in elec-
trified areas. Panel C presents the results from the reduced-form regressions. Across
all columns, being closer to the hypothetical grid causes all firm-level outcomes to
be significantly larger. For robustness, table 4.8 in appendix 4.5 section 4.A repeats
the same analysis but using a different definition for access; Connectedi t , This is
a dummy variable defined at the firm-level instead of the desa-level and is equal
to one if a firm is observed consuming a positive amount of grid electricity in the
census. There is still a strong first stage of this different definition of access on the
instrument, and the results are similar to those in table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Impact of access on the sales and inputs at the firm level.
Sample: Firm-Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Sales Capital Wage Bill Nb Workers Energy Bill Electricity
(Log) (kWh)
Panel A: OLS
Access 0.466*** 0.416*** 0.348*** 0.197*** 0.447*** 0.499***
(0.0592) (0.0592) (0.0422) (0.0275) (0.0888) (0.0933)
Panel B: IV
Access 2.511*** 3.417*** 1.788*** 1.169*** 4.015*** 5.125***
(0.615) (0.648) (0.403) (0.266) (0.781) (1.256)
First Stage F 41.55 41.55 41.51 41.55 40.48 30.89
Panel C: Reduced Form IV
Z (KM) -0.00665*** -0.00933*** -0.00505*** -0.00336*** -0.0114*** -0.0110***
(0.00134) (0.00139) (0.00102) (0.000661) (0.00180) (0.00204)
Observations 141,615 141,615 141,615 141,615 139,481 120,453
IndustryxYear FE X X X X X X
Province FE X X X X X X
Geo Controls X X X X X X
Firm Controls X X X X X X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from OLS, IV, and reduced form regressions of equation (2.2). Geographic controls
are defined at the desa level and include distance to coast, distance to nearest city, elevation, distance
to road, desa political and legal status, and infrastructure controls. Firm Controls include export, co-
hort, and ownership dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the desa level.
Relative to the existing literature, the most readily comparable results to what I find
are from Allcott, Collard-Wexler, and O’Connell (2016). In their paper, the authors
look at the effect of shortages on firm-level outcomes. They find that a 1 percent-
age point increase in shortages causes a 1.1% decrease in within firm sales. Ac-
cess to electricity can be thought of as a 100 percentage points decrease in short-
ages, which would then translate into a 200% increase in sales revenue1. Compared
comparable to the Allcott, Collard-Wexler, and O’Connell (2016) result, the effect of
electrification on average sales in the desa is much larger. This means that in ad-
dition to the within firm effect of electrification on sales, there are large selection
effects. The size of the effect confirms the fact that the extensive margin of elec-
tricity supply has a bigger effect on the industrial sector relative to the effect of the
intensive margin. One explanation is that electrification is likely to reduce entry
costs by more relative to improvements in the reliability of electricity supply. If sunk
costs of entry are significantly affected by electrification, the effect on average firm
outcomes will be larger, because of selection. Lower barriers to entry would attract
more entrepreneurs across the whole productivity distribution, leading to tougher
selection and therefore more productive firms on average. Allcott, Collard-Wexler,
1∆y = exp(1.1)−1= 2
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and O’Connell (2016) also find that shortages do not affect labor input. In contrast,
I find a large effect of access on average number of manufacturing workers in the
desa, confirming that the extensive margin of electricity has a more considerable
effect on the industrial sector.
4.2.2 Input Substitution
I now investigate how electrification affects the firm’s input substitution patterns.
Electricity is an input of production that is primarily used to power machinery. As
electricity becomes cheaper with access, a production technology with substitution
across inputs predicts that the firms should substitute away for the other inputs and
more towards electricity. An interesting question is therefore whether electrification
affects the demand for different inputs differently.
Table 4.2 shows how access to the grid affects firm-level input ratios. As in Table 4.1,
the OLS estimates in Panel A are positive but smaller in magnitude relative to the
IV estimates in panel B. Column (1) Panel B shows access causes the capital-labor
ratio of the firm to increase. From columns (2) and (3), both the energy-capital and
energy-labor ratios increase, but the second increases three times as much. This
explains the increase in the capital-labor ratio. All these results depict a particular
input substitution pattern where capital and energy are complimentary and labor
and energy are more substitutable (or at least, there is less substitution between
capital and energy than labor and energy).
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Table 4.2: Electrification and the firm’s input ratios.
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable log(K/L) log(E/K) log(E/L)
Panel A: OLS
Connected 0.067* 0.0523 0.119*
(0.038) (0.0632) (0.0652)
Panel B: IV
Access 1.630*** 0.808* 2.360***
(0.392) (0.463) (0.541)
First Stage F 41.51 40.48 40.46
Panel C: Reduced Form IV
Access -0.0048*** -0.0024* -0.0069***
(0.00092) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Observations 141,598 139,678 139,664
IndustryxYear FE X X X
Province FE X X X
Geo Controls X X X
Firm Controls X X X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from OLS, IV, and reduced form regressions. Geographic controls are defined
at the desa level and include distance to coast, distance to nearest city, elevation, distance to
road, desa political and legal status, and infrastructure controls. Firm Controls include export, co-
hort, and ownership dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the desa level.
There are two theoretical reasons that could be driving these differential responses
to electrification across inputs. The first is input substitution and different degrees
of substitutability between products. When the unit price of an input of production
decreases, the overall marginal cost of production decreases, leading to an increase
across all input demands, and the increase would be highest for the input which
prices has decreased. This is one possible interpretation of the results observed in
table 4.1. But if capital is more complementary to electricity than labor, then a de-
crease in the price of electricity will lead to a larger increase in demand for capital
relative to the increase in the demand for labor; thus increasing the capital-labor
ratio. If capital and electricity are more complimentary than labor and electricity,
when the unit price of electricity falls, this will lead to substitution away from capital
and labor towards electricity, but more so for labor. In other words, just as observed
in table 4.2, a lower unit price of electricity leads to an increase in the ratios of elec-
tricity to the other inputs of production, but the electricity-labor ratio will increase
by more than the electricity-capital ratio.
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All these effects of electrification can be explained by a decrease in the unit price of
electricity and differential substitution patterns, without any changes in the produc-
tion technology, i.e. the production function coefficients are the same. In chapter 5,
I structurally estimate a production function allowing for flexible substitution pat-
terns to plausibility of the above interpretation. A second reason why these substi-
tution patterns might emerge is a technological effect where electrification changes
the production function of the firm. I explore this possibility in more detail in chap-
ter 6. In the remainder of this chapter, I focus on readily observable firm-level out-
come variables and relegate the analysis that requires prior structural estimation to
chapters 5 and chapter 6. Next, I evaluate the effect of electrification on firm sur-
vival.
4.2.3 Effect of Access on Incumbent Firms
The estimated coefficients in tables 4.1 and 4.2 represent the average causal differ-
ence between outcomes of firms in electrified desas and non-electrified desas. It
combines the effect of access on incumbent firms as well as the selection effect of
access where electrification potentially systematically more productive firms or less
productive firms. To get a sense of how much of the estimated effect of access on
firm outcomes is driven by selection of different firms versus an effect on incum-
bents, I estimate equation 2.2 with firm fixed effects:
yi v pst =α+βAccessv pst +νXi v pst +ηVv pt +γi +δst +²i v pst (4.1)
where γi is a firm fixed effect. As with the desa-level regression with fixed effect, I
use an interaction of the same instrument with time dummies. This is because the
hypothetical least cost instrument does not vary over time and will not be able to
identify within firm effects. Table 4.3 presents these results. The OLS estimates in
panel A are biased towards zero. Focusing on the panel B, column (1), the estimated
coefficient of the causal effect of electrification on the incumbents’ sales revenue is
positive and significant. Electrification causes the firm’s sales to increase by 18%.
While there is a significant positive effect of access to electricity on firms, this effect
is less than a tenth of the estimated coefficient estimated in table 4.1 resulting from
specification (2.2). The difference between (4.1) and (2.2) is that the the first esti-
mates the effect of electrification within firm, or on incumbents who switch from
not being connected to being connected to the grid, while the second estimates the
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causal effect of electrification on average firm outcomes across desas. Therefore,
the results in table 4.3 do not include the effect of selection, while the results in ta-
ble 4.1 do. Given that the estimated effect of electrification on the sales revenue of
incumbents is around a tenth of the estimated effect including selection, this indi-
cates that the selection effects of electrification are substantial and drive most of the
increase in manufacturing output at a local level.
Looking at columns (2) and (3) in panel B, the effect of electrification on capital and
wages is positive and smaller in magnitude than the effects estimated without the
fixed effects, although the results are statistically insignificant. This is not too sur-
prising as capital and labor could face some adjustment costs that hinder the firm
from adjust its production process in the short and medium run. The coefficient in
column (4) on the number of workers is negative, but not significant. One interpre-
tation of the negative sign, although not significant, could be that these switching
incumbents are becoming less labor intensive. These results are in line with Allcott,
Collard-Wexler, and O’Connell (2016).
Finally columns (5) and (6) in panel B show that electrification causes the switch-
ing incumbents to consume more electricity, as expected. Together with the results
from columns (1) to (4), all these results point to a strong selection mechanism that
is driving the increase in local industrial outcomes.
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Table 4.3: Impact of access on the sales and inputs at the firm level.
Sample: Firm-Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Sales Capital Wage Bill Nb Workers Energy Bill Electricity
(Log) (kWh)
Panel A: OLS
Access 0.0263 -0.0458** -0.0163 -0.0128 0.0361 0.0697**
(0.0193) (0.0211) (0.0197) (0.00987) (0.0228) (0.0323)
Panel B: IV
Access 0.186** 0.00850 0.0781 -0.0317 0.407*** 0.287**
(0.0945) (0.110) (0.0845) (0.0519) (0.124) (0.130)
First Stage F 21.95 21.95 21.94 21.95 21.80 22.17
Observations 133,349 133,349 133,334 133,349 131,495 113,655
Firm FE X X X X X X
IndustryxYear FE X X X X X X
Geo Controls X X X X X X
Firm Controls X X X X X X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from OLS, and IV regressions of equation 4.1. The reduced-form results are omit-
ted for ease of exposition. Geographic controls are defined at the desa level and include distance to
coast, distance to nearest city, elevation, distance to road, desa political and legal status, and infras-
tructure controls. Firm Controls include export, cohort, and ownership dummies. Robust standard
errors in parentheses clustered at the desa level.
4.3 Electrification and Survival
I now examine whether electrification affects turnover in the economy. In other
words, does the expanded access to electricity increase firm selection the desa? I
start by investigating the effect of electrification on the probability of exit. I estimate
a linear probability model where I regress an exit dummy on access, instrumented
with distance to the hypothetical and controlling for desa-level and firm-level char-
acteristics as above. Before presenting the results, a discussion about how exit is
defined is necessary. I define exit in period t as a dummy variable equal to one if
the firm drops out of the census in period t + 1. Because this is a census of firms
with 20 or more employees, it could be that the firm did not actually exit the market,
but instead shrank below the size threshold. For that reason, I restrict the definition
of exiting firms to those who are not in the survey in year t +1 and have at least 25
employees, which is the 25th percentile of size in the data.
Table 4.4 shows results from the OLS, IV and reduced-form regressions. Column (1)
panel A presents the OLS estimate of the effect of access on the average exit prob-
ability. The coefficient is positive and significant indicating that the probability of
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exit and being in an electrified desa are positively correlated. The corresponding IV
regression is in column (1) panel B, and as before, the magnitude of the OLS esti-
mate is smaller than the IV estimate. The coefficient shows that the causal effect
of electrification on selection is an increase of around 5% in the probability of exit.
Column (1) panel C show the reduced-form regressions of exit on the distance to
the hypothetical least cost grid, showing that the closer the firm is to the least cost
network, the more likely it is to exit. This suggests that survival in the industry is less
likely in electrified desas.
Table 4.4 column (2) shows the effect of electrification on the age distribution of
firms. It presents the OLS, IV and reduced form regressions of a dummy variable
youngi t equal to 1 if a firm is below the median age. Results show that firms in elec-
trified desas are on average younger. This finding is consistent with electrification
shifting the age distribution of firms towards younger firms by (i) increasing entry,
therefore having more younger firms, and (ii) increasing exit, therefore shortening
the average firm age in the desa.
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Table 4.4: Electrification, exit, and the age distribution.
Sample: Firm-Level
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable Exit Young
Panel A: OLS
Accessv pt 0.0077*** 0.0371***
(0.002) (0.0148)
Panel B: IV
Accessv pt 0.049** 0.242**
(0.016) (0.099)
First Stage F 41.55 41.55
Panel C: Reduced Form IV
Z (KM) -0.000144*** -0.000718**
(3.82e-05) (0.000281)
Observations 141,615 141,615
IndustryxYear FE X X
Province FE X X
Geo Controls X X
Firm Controls X X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from OLS, IV and reduced-form regressions for a young dummy access to electric-
ity defined at the desa level. Young is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm’s age is below the median age.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the desa level. Geographic controls are defined
at the desa level and include distance to coast, distance to nearest city, elevation, distance to road,
desa political and legal status, and infrastructure controls. Firm Controls include export, cohort, and
ownership dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the desa level.
Interesting conclusions can be drawn from the results in table 4.4. The decrease
in the survival probability and the shift in the age distribution of firms are sign of
tougher selection in the market. Electrification makes it less likely for a firm to sur-
vive in the market, consistent with the results in chapter 3 where electrification in-
creases exit rates. Also consistent with the results in chapter 3 on higher entry rates,
electrification shifts the age distribution of firms towards younger firm. These re-
sults at the firm level confirm that electrification increases firm turnover, as shown
at the desa-level in chapter 3. This is a sign of healthy churning where markets be-
come better at weeding out the inefficient firms with electrification. The implica-
tions on average industry productivity will be examined in the next chapter.
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4.4 Spillovers
As with the desa-level analysis, a threat to identification in the empirical analysis in
this chapter is a violation of the SUTVA assumption, or spillovers. In reality, firms in
certain desa can sell their output in different desas. Results from the firm-level anal-
ysis show that connected firms sell more. Another interesting question is therefore
whether these firms are stealing business from unconnected firms. In other words,
is there any creation of new output in response to electrification, or is production
moving from non-electrified desas to electrified desas?
Given that the data I use in this chapter is more detailed and I can observe the in-
dustries in which firms operate, it is interesting to test for spillovers in response to
electrification within industries. If there are any spillovers or general equilibrium
effects, they are strongest and more detectable within industry. This is because re-
sults point at a competitive effect of electrification, where electrification intensifies
competition and leads to tougher selection, which theoretically happens within an
industry.
To check if spillovers or business stealing effects are present in my context, I run
three tests. The extent to which these spillovers exist and might differ by industry
depends on various factors. These factors include how easy it is to transport the
products and how spread out geographically the demand is.
First, it depends on the type of goods produced and their tradability. For exam-
ple, we except these spillovers to minimal in the context of non-tradable goods. To
test this, I estimate the effect of access on firm sales in the non-tradable sectors2. I
consider certain products to be non-tradables because of their heavy weight which
involves significantly large transportation costs. Table 4.5 presents the IV results for
this exercise. I find a coefficient of 2.3, which is very close to the estimate found
using the whole sample in table 4.1 panel B column (1). This shows that in a set-
ting where business stealing effects or spillovers should be minimal because of large
transportation costs, electrification still increases average firm sales. This indicates
that there is some new economic activity being generated from electrification.
2These are two three-digit industries (263 and 264 ISIC Rev3). They include the following cate-
gories: refractory bricks, clay products, clay bricks, clay tiles, structural clay, cement, lime plaster,
gyps
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from OLS and IV regressions. Geographic controls are defined at the desa level and
include distance to coast, distance to nearest city, elevation, distance to road, desa political and legal
status, and infrastructure controls. Firm Controls include export, cohort, and ownership dummies.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the desa level.
Second, I test for general equilibrium effects by regressing firm sales on the number
of switching neighboring districts:
yi v pst =α+βMv pst +ηXi v pst +θZv pt +ηVv pst +γp +δst +²i v pst (4.2)
The idea is that if spacial spillovers exist, then the number of switching districts
around the firm desa should affect firm revenue negatively. Here the assumption is
that trade costs are infinite for further away districts. It is a strong assumption but it
is supposed to capture that trade costs increase with distance. If there are spillovers,
they will be strongest between neighboring districts. Because the number of switch-
ing neighbors is endogenous, I instrument for it with the average distance to hypo-
thetical least cost grid in the district, conditional on the firm’s own distance to the
least cost network3.
Table 4.6 shows the corresponding OLS and IV regressions. Column (2) presents the
IV regression. The coefficient on number of switching firms is negative statistically
insignificant. This rejects the presence of spacial spillovers. Even if the coefficient
3These two distances are not collinear given the variation in the shape of the hypothetical least
cost grid.
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were to be significant, the implied effect is very small4 (0.3) relative to the effect of
access I find in table 4.1 column (2) Panel B and cannot explain more than 13% of
the difference in average sales between electrified and non-electrified firms.
Table 4.6: Testing For Spillovers
(1) (2)
OLS IV
Dependent Variable Sales Sales
(Log)
Nb switching neighbors 0.149*** -0.108
(0.0234) (0.153)
Z (KM) -0.00776*** -0.00668***
(0.00129) (0.00156)
Observations 141,615 141,420
First Stage F 45.02
IndustryxYear FE X X
Province FE X X
Geo Controls X X
Firm Controls X X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from OLS and IV regressions. Geographic controls are defined
at the desa level and include distance to coast, distance to nearest city, elevation,
distance to road, desa political and legal status, and infrastructure controls. Firm
Controls include export, cohort, and ownership dummies. Robust standard er-
rors in parentheses clustered at the desa level.
Finally, I look for spillovers within narrowly defined industries across the whole is-
land. I run the same test as in equation 4.2 at the industry level. The number of
switchers in a certain industry is counted in the whole island, as opposed to the
neighboring geographic locations as in the previous test, but within a 5-digit indus-
try. Results from IV regressions are presented in table 4.7. The coefficient in column
(1) is the estimated effect of an increase in the number of switching competitors on
the sales of non-switchers for all industries pooled together is statistically zero. I
estimate this relationship again by industry. Across all industry, the estimated co-
efficients are negative but very small. In column (2), I run the same test for non-
tradables and I find a precisely estimated effect of zero. This is not surprising as
spillovers are not expected in this particular type of industries. For textiles in col-
4This is equal to the estimated coefficient −0.108 times the average number of switching neigh-
bors, which is around 3
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umn (4), I also find a precisely estimated zero.
Table 4.7: Testing For Spillovers within a 5-digit industry
Dependent Variable Log Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Industry All non-tradables Food Textiles
& Bev.
Number of 0.00181 -0.000866 -0.0234 -0.000858
Switching Competitors (0.00542) (0.00346) (0.0253) (0.0509)
First Stage F 86.47 124.5 91.83 50.64
Observations 113,115 10,861 24,329 15,317
Mean RHS 10.1 20.5 6.2 5.8
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Apparel Furniture Rubber All
& Footwear & plastic
Number of -0.0164 -0.0305 -0.0270
Switching Competitors (0.0102) (0.0443) (0.0412)
Access 2.057***
(0.497)
Observations 16,058 10,836 6,887 113,115
First Stage F 340.5 45.80 477.2 35.11
Mean RHS 11.8 11.9 2.5
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from IV regressions. The dependent variable is log sales. The first column shows the
regression of the whole sample of firms. The RHS variable is the number of switching competitors. A
switching competitor is a firm in the same 5-digit industry that switches from being without access
to having access to the grid. Columns (2) - (7) shows the same regression for each of the top 6 largest
industries separately. Column (8) presents the effect of access on sales of all firms in the 6 largest in-
dustries. Geographic controls are defined at the desa level and include distance to coast, distance to
nearest city, elevation, distance to road, desa political and legal status, and infrastructure controls.
Firm Controls include export, cohort, and ownership dummies. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses clustered at the desa level.
For the other industries in columns (3) Food and Beverages, (5) Apparel, (6) Fur-
niture and (7) Rubber, the coefficients are statistically indistinguishable from zero,
and the magnitudes are small. Using the mean number of switching competitors in
the industry in the row "Mean RHS" and the estimated coefficients in columns (1)
and (8), spillovers can explain only around 10% of the effect of access. Doing the
same back of the envelope calculation for the highest among these estimated coef-
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ficients for furniture in column (6), spillovers can explain at most around 20% of the
estimated effect.
Based on the results in this section, I conclude that spillovers are not a major con-
cern in this setting. The evidence for business stealing effects is fairly limited, and
results from chapter 3 show no evidence for spillovers at the extensive margin (firm
entry and relocation). A potential reason why spillovers are limited is as follows.
Given the large number of desas (23,000 per year), and the large number of firms
(16,104 per year on average), such spillover effects could be negligible or unde-
tectable because each unit is too small to affect its competitors if Java is consid-
ered as one single market. The fact that despite the absence of spillovers there are
positive and significant large effects of electrification strongly suggests that electri-
fication does indeed create new industrial activity.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I find that electrification not only increases industrial activity at a
local level by increasing the number of firms, but it also affects the performance
of firms in the market. Firms in electrified desas are larger, both in terms of how
much they sell but also in how much inputs they consume. Consistent with higher
turnover at the desa-level, firms in electrified desas face a higher probability of exit,
and are more likely to be younger. As for business stealing effects, they appear to
be minimal in the particular case of Indonesian manufacturing. While violations of
SUTVA cannot be completely ruled out, evidence in this chapter shows that if there
are any issues in identification related to spillovers, these issues are not severe and




Table 4.8: Impact of connection on the sales and inputs at the firm level.
Sample: Firm-Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Sales Capital Wage Bill Nb Workers Energy Bill Electricity
(Log) (kWh)
Panel A: OLS
Connectedi t 0.610*** 0.686*** 0.393*** 0.186*** 0.675*** 0.0394
(0.0532) (0.0529) (0.0354) (0.0249) (0.0796) (0.0676)
Panel B: IV
Connectedi t 3.531*** 4.805*** 2.512*** 1.644*** 6.050*** 29.22**
(0.716) (0.912) (0.589) (0.396) (1.165) (12.29)
First Stage F 33.82 33.82 33.86 33.82 27.08 8.044
Panel C: Reduced Form IV
Z (KM) -0.00665*** -0.00933*** -0.00505*** -0.00336*** -0.0114*** -0.0110***
(0.00134) (0.00139) (0.00102) (0.000661) (0.00180) (0.00204)
Observations 141,615 141,615 141,615 141,615 139,481 120,453
IndustryxYear FE X X X X X X
Province FE X X X X X X
Geo Controls X X X X X X
Firm Controls X X X X X X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from OLS, IV, and reduced form regressions of equation (2.2). Connectedi t is a
dummy equal to one if the firm is observed consuming a positive quantity of grid electricity. Geo-
graphic controls are defined at the desa level and include distance to coast, distance to nearest city,
elevation, distance to road, desa political and legal status, and infrastructure controls. Firm Controls







So far, I have presented evidence on how electrification affects industrial develop-
ment. An interesting question arising from this evidence is whether electrification
has any implications on industry productivity. In particular, in this chapter I am
interested in finding out if there are any productivity enhancing effects of electrifi-
cation at the industry level.
In order to do this, I will need to estimate productivity. The literature on structural
estimation of production functions has provided us with a set of tools to recover
consistent productivity estimates. I will use different methods from the frontier of
this literature and I will compare the results using the respective productivity esti-
mates. When estimating productivity, I will specifically pay attention to how access
to electricity might threaten these methods and I will present solutions. In particu-
lar, one issue that needs to be dealt with when estimating the production function
and backing out productivity estimates for the purpose of finding the causal effect of
electrification on average productivity relates to survival. As I have shown in chap-
ters 3 and 4, electrification affects firm survival. Hence, the fact that electrification
affects selection in the market needs to be addressed when estimating productivity.
Before turning the empirical model, I first present a theoretical model to motivate
the empirical analysis and to clarify the different channels through which electrifi-
cation can affect aggregate industrial productivity.
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5.2 Theoretical Motivation
5.2.1 How can Access to Electricity Affect Productivity?
The purpose of this section is to lay out conceptually the different ways electrifi-
cation can affect the firm and industry outcomes, keeping in mind the Indonesian
context. During the years that the study covers (1990-2000), almost all Indonesian
manufacturing firms were using electricity in their production process, but if they
were not connected to the grid then they had to rely on self-generation. Since elec-
tricity is an input of production, gaining access to the grid will affect the price of
the electricity input that the firm faces. Self-generation affects the firm’s cost struc-
ture in at least two ways. First, in order to start production, the firm needs to in-
cur the cost of buying a generator, which can be hefty, especially for industrial use.
This means that electrification can affect the entry costs of a firm. Second, access
to the grid will allow to the firm to buy electricity at a cheaper price than the self-
generation price, therefore affecting the marginal cost of the firm. To fix ideas, I do
not think of access to electricity as directly affecting within firm productivity (pro-
ductivity is not a function of access), however, electrification can affect selection
in the market which in turn affects the average productivity of surviving firms. In
the next section, I will present an industry model to understand how each of these
channels will affect selection in the market and the implications on average indus-
try productivity.
I present below a model of a monopolistically competitive industry à la Syverson
(2007) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) to illustrate the effects of the grid expansion
on the manufacturing sector. The goal is to analyze selection, allowing for compe-
tition effects. As the grid reaches more areas, the entry decision of firms in these
areas will be affected through a reduction in the sunk cost of entry. In addition, as
more firms in the market are getting connected, and thus becoming more efficient,
this will affect the survival of incumbents (and expected value of entry) as a higher
proportion of more efficient firms in the market means more intense competition.
5.2.2 Demand
Consider an industry with a continuum of firms of measure N, each indexed by i .
Firm i produces a differentiated variety in the market. Consumers have utility U
defined over these differentiated varieties indexed by i in set I and a Hicksian com-
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where H is the consumption of the Hicksian composite good and qi is the con-
sumption of variety i . The demand parameter η ∈ (0,1) represents the degree of









where p¯ ≡ 1N
∫
i∈I pi is the average price in the market conditional on survival. Define
pmax as the highest price consumers are willing to pay which can be calculated from




ηN +γ p¯ (5.3)
The residual demand for product i from (5.2) can therefore be written as:
qi = 1
γ
(pmax −pi ) (5.4)
5.2.3 Production
On the production side, consider a single input technology1 where firm i produces
according the the following production function:
qi =φi xi (5.5)
where φi is the firm’s physical productivity and xi is the input of production which
is supplied inelastically at a constant2 price w . Therefore, firm i ’s marginal cost is
ci = wφi . Combined with the demand form, the profit maximizing price is:
p(ci )= 1
2
(pmax + ci ) (5.6)
1The assumption of a single input production process is without loss of generality when consid-
ering a multiple input production function with constant returns to scale.
2This simple representation is meant to capture that although firms are heterogeneous in their
productivity they face the same price of electricity which is set by the state, either directly (price per
kWh or price of fuel). This is true in the case of Indonesia where the energy sector is heavily regulated
and the price is the same everywhere in the country.
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The equilibrium profit is:
pi(ci )= 1
4γ
(pmax − ci )2 (5.7)
Firm i will stay in the market as long as pi(w,φi ) ≥ 0. This gives the cut-off level of
marginal cost c∗ such that the firm will not want to stay in the market if its marginal
cost exceeds it:
c∗ = pmax = γα
ηN +γ +
ηN
ηN +γ p¯ (5.8)
Firm price, mark-up and quantity can therefore be written as:
p(ci )= 1
2
(c∗+ ci ) (5.9)
µ(ci )= 1
2
(c∗− ci ) (5.10)
q(ci )= 1
2γ
(c∗− ci ) (5.11)
Firm price is increasing in its own marginal cost, but more efficient firms charge
relatively higher markups and produced relatively more. The more efficient the
marginal firm is (lower c∗), the tougher competition is, reducing firm prices, markups
and quantity demanded, conditional of the firm’s own marginal cost. The cutoff c∗




Firms with productivityφi <φ∗ will not be profitable and will exit the market. There-
fore, pmax = wφ∗ .
5.2.4 Long Run Equilibrium
In the long run, a large number of ex-ante identical potential firms decide whether
to enter the market. Before observing their productivity, potential entrants have to
pay a sunk cost of entry s. They then receive a productivity draw from a distribution
G(φ) with support [φ,∞]. In equilibrium, the expected value of entry should be
equal to zero for positive entry to occur:










dG(φ)− s = 0 (5.13)
Equation (5.13) pins down φ∗ which summarizes the equilibrium. The equilibrium
mass of firms N is determined using equations (5.6) and (5.8).
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5.2.5 Predictions
The goal of this exercise is to see how the equilibrium cut-off changes with access
to electricity. This can be studied through comparative statics with respect to two
parameters. The first is the input price w . Access to the grid reduces the per-unit
price of electricity. The second is the sunk cost of entry s. Entry to a location where
the grid hasn’t arrived is potentially more expensive as the firm will need to purchase








since ∂V e /∂φ∗ < 0 and ∂V e /∂w > 0. Therefore, a decrease in w will lead to a lower
productivity cut-off. Intuitively, as the input price is lower, a firm that wasn’t able to
survive before will be able to do so now. As for the sunk cost of entry, the cutoff φ∗







This says that if access to electricity reduces the sunk cost of entry, then this will in-
crease the average productivity in the industry. The intuition is as follows. If access
to electricity lowers barriers to entry, more firms will enter the market, across the
whole productivity distribution. This intensifies competitive pressure and makes it
more difficult for relatively unproductive firms to survive in equilibrium.
In order to understand how average industrial outcomes could be affected by elec-
trification, it is useful to focus the analysis on changes in the marginal cost cutoff c∗.
This is because although the effect of access onφ∗ is interesting, what ultimately de-
termines the equilibrium outcomes is a combination of input prices and firm pro-
ductivity, i.e. the marginal cost of the firm. Revisiting the comparative statics with
respect to input price w and sunk cost of entry s gives the following predictions. The
effect of a decrease in w on c∗ is ambiguous. Although φ∗ increases with a decrease
in w , this doesn’t necessarily mean that the marginal cost of the marginal firm c∗
is lower. The overall effect depends on the relative effects of the decrease in w and
increase in φ∗. As for the sunk cost of entry, conditional on w , a decrease in s un-
ambiguously leads to a decrease c∗.
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φ dG(φ). Given a
distribution of productivity G(.), the averages of firm outcomes in equations (5.9)-










where z¯ = 11−G(φ∗)
∫∞
φ∗ z(φ)dG(φ). Intuitively, c¯ is increasing in c
∗. If the marginal
firm is more efficient (lower c∗), then the average firm efficiency in the industry is
higher (lower c¯). Equation (5.16) predicts that the average observed prices condi-
tional of firm survival is lower when c∗ is lower. Equations (5.17) and (5.18) however
give an ambiguous prediction on a change in c∗ on average markups and quanti-
ties. On the one hand, a lower c∗ means tougher competition in the market, reduc-
ing firm markups and quantities produced. However, tougher selection also means
that the set of surviving firms are more efficient (lower c¯), and as seen from equa-
tions (5.10) and (5.11), more efficient firms charge relatively higher markups and
produced more. Which effects dominates depends on the distribution of produc-
tivity G(.) and its support.
Recall that in equilibrium, the zero profit condition states that the profit of the
marginal firm should be equal to zero. This condition requires that c∗ = pmax :
c∗ = p¯+ γ(α− p¯)
ηN +γ (5.19)
The equilibrium mass of active firms as a function of c∗ is therefore:
N = 2γ(α− c
∗)
η(c∗− c¯) (5.20)
These equations state that tougher competition (lower c∗) is associated with a higher
mass of active firms N and a lower average price3 p¯. To see this4, suppose N in-
creases, and that surviving firms don’t change their prices following entry, keeping
p¯ constant. From equation (5.19), c∗ will decrease. From equation (5.16), p¯ will
3An implicit assumption here is that α> c∗ which implies that α is greater than p¯ and c¯.
4The intuition is the same as in Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, Puga, and Roux (2012).
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decrease as result, which further decreases c∗. In addition, the model predicts that
firm exit rates unambiguously increase when the marginal cost cutoff c∗ is lower.
The probability of survival, which is equal to G˜(c∗) = 1−G( w
φ∗ ), is decreasing in c
∗.
Intuitively, tougher competition is associated with tougher selection where condi-
tional on its own efficiency, a firm’s probability of survival is lower.
The relationship between access to electricity and firm-level and industry-level out-
comes can be interpreted through the lens of the model. The averages of firm out-
comes in (5.16)-(5.18) correspond to the respective observed firm outcomes in the
data. If access to the grid reduces fixed cost of entry, the model predicts that access
will lead to tougher selection in the market induced by entry of a larger number
of firms. In addition, the model predicts that higher exit rates are associated with
tougher selection and a higher efficiency cutoff.
Finally, equations (5.14) and (5.15) state that average physical productivity φ in-
creases if barriers to entry are lower, but decreases in response to an increase in the
input price. This sharp prediction is informative regarding the channels through
which access to electricity is affecting the manufacturing sector.
The insights from the model will therefore guide the empirical analysis in the subse-
quent sections and help interpret the results. Table 5.1 summarizes the predictions
of the model, split by the different channels :
Table 5.1: Model Predictions.
Effect of Electrification
# Outcome barriers to entry s ↓ input price px ↓
1 Effect on competition φ∗ ↑ φ∗ ↓
2 Average revenue productivity ? ?
T F PR =φ∗p φ¯ ↑&p¯ ↓ φ¯ ↓& p¯?
3 Average marginal cost c¯ ↓ ?
4 Probability of exit ↑ ↓
5 Age distribution young old
6 Firm turnover ↑ ↓
The simplicity of the model, which is useful to guide the empirical analysis, means
that the model abstracts from many features that are potentially important. I dis-
cuss the limitations of the model and how they affect the results in appendix 5.A.
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5.3 Measuring Productivity
5.3.1 Methodology and Literature Review
Consider the following revenue-based Cobb-Douglas production function in logs
defined at the industry level:
yi t =βk ki t +βl li t +βe ei t +φi t +²i t (5.21)
where yi t is output, ki t if capital, li t is the wage bill and ei t is total spending on elec-
tricity. φi t is firm i ’s productivity in year t . It subsumes the constant term. Finally,
²i t is an i.i.d. random shock. This equation is the basis of the empirical framework
and will be estimated separately for each industry.
The classic endogeneity challenge in estimating equation (5.21) arises from the fact
that φi t is observable by the firm when it is choosing its fully flexible inputs such
as labor and electricity but not to the econometrician. This leads to biased OLS
estimates of the vector of the production function coefficients β. This is the simul-
taneity bias. Another concern here is the survival bias. Only surviving firms are
observed in the data. Empirically, it is observed that larger firms can survive larger
shocks. This creates a positive correlation between firm size, measured by capital,
and the survival probability conditional on the same shock, which will lead to a bias
in the OLS estimates of the coefficient on capital. This is the survival bias.
Economists have been trying to solve the endogeneity problem arising from simul-
taneity bias for decades. Griliches and Mairesse (1995) and Ackerberg, Caves, and
Frazer (2015) present a great summary of the early literature as well as the frontier
which I will briefly reiterate here. I will further discuss these biases in relation to
access to electricity.
Among the earliest attempts to account for these biases are the fixed effects ap-
proach, which requires the strong assumption of time-invariant productivity φi ,
and the instrumental variable approach (Mundlak (1961), Hoch (1962)) using input
prices as instruments under the assumption of perfectly competitive input markets.
The instrumental variable approach did not work very well in practice first because
typically input prices do not vary sufficiently within an industry across firms and if
they do it is because of things like differentiated input qualities, making these in-
struments invalid.
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5.3.2 Simultaneity Bias
The simultaneity bias arises because firms choose their inputs to maximize their
profits, potentially after observing at least some information about their own pro-
ductivity φi t that is unobservable to the econometrician.
The frontier literature on dealing with the simultaneity bias was initiated by Olley
and Pakes (1996). Their insight was that an observable choice variable of the firm,
investment in their case, can be used as a proxy to infer unobserved firm produc-
tivity. Using the first order condition of the firm’s choice of investment, conditional
on capital, the investment function can be inverted to recover φi t . Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) propose using materials spending or electricity spending as a the proxy
to avoid problems arising from the lumpiness of investment. They also argue that
these more flexible inputs are more likely to satisfy the monotonicity assumption
needed when inverting the proxy to recover productivity. Both these papers suggest
a two-step estimation algorithm, the validity of which crucially relies on timing as-
sumptions. Specifically, at time t when the firm observes its productivityφi t , capital
ki t is predetermined, hence it is a state variable, and the other inputs (labor li t and
ei t electricity) are fully flexible and are chosen after the firm observes φi t .
The first step proceeds as follows. Using the F.O.C. of the proxy variable ιi t , the opti-
mal choice of ιi t can be written as a function of productivity and state variables. For
simplicity assume for now that the only state variable is capital:
ιi t = h(φi t ,ki t )
A necessary condition for ιi t to be a valid proxy is for its demand function h(.) to be
strictly increasing in φi t conditional on ki t . This is the monotonicity assumption
which states that more productive firms will invest more or consume more inputs.
Another assumption required for the proxy to be invertible is a scalar unobervable,
i.e. productivity is the only variable in the proxy function that is unobservable to
the econometrician. Using a first order condition of the firm’s optimization prob-
lem, the proxy can be inverted to infer productivity. Now φi t can be recovered by
inverting the h(.) function:
φi t = h−1(ιi t ,ki t ) (5.22)
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Substituting back in equation (5.21):
yi t =βl li t +βe ei t +κ(ιi t ,ki t )+²i t (5.23)
where
κ(ιi t ,ki t )=βk ki t +φi t =βk ki t +h−1(ιi t ,ki t ) (5.24)
Given that h−1(ιi t ,ki t ) includes capital, the coefficient on capital βk cannot be sep-
arately identified from the coefficient on capital in h−1(.), hence the κ(.).
Equation (5.23) is the first stage estimation equation where the κ(.) function is esti-
mated nonparametrically and is approximated by a second-order polynomial in the
proxy variable and capital. This is the control function approach. Only βl and βe
are estimated in this step of the algorithm. In the case where electricity spending is
the proxy, or ιi t = ei t , then only βl is estimated in this step. In what follows, let vi t
represent the free variable inputs that are not used as a proxy and are estimated in
the first stage. An estimate κˆ(.) is also obtained from this step.
The second stage of the estimation algorithm aims at estimating the remaining pro-
duction function coefficients (βk in addition to βe in case electricity spending is
used as a proxy) and to correct for the survival bias. An important assumption here
is that φi t follows a first-order Markov process where productivity today only de-
pends on productivity in the previous period and a random shock:
φi t = g (φi t−1)+ηi t (5.25)
where g (.) is an unknown function and ηi t is an i.i.d. shock uncorrelated with ki t−1.
Replacing φi t by its law of motion in the production function, the second-stage es-
timation equation is as follows:
yi t −Σv βˆv vi t =βk ki t + g (κˆ(ιi t−1,ki t−1)−βk ki t−1)+ηi t +²i t (5.26)
whereφi t−1 is rewritten in terms of the κ function, capital and the proxy using equa-
tion (5.24):
φi t−1 = κ(ιi t−1,ki t−1)−βk ki t−1
Identification of βk in this stage relies on the timing assumption that capital in pe-
riod t , ki t , is predetermined and therefore is uncorrelated with φi t = g (φi t−1)+ηi t .
The g (.) function is estimated nonparametrically and is approximated by a polyno-
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mial in κˆi t−1 and ki t−1. If ei t is used as the proxy, then the second-stage estimation
equation is:
yi t −Σv βˆv vi t =βk ki t +βe ei t +g (κˆ(ei t−1,ki t−1)−βk ki t−1−βe ei t−1)+ηi t +²i t (5.27)
Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015) shed light on a potential functional dependence
problem in the first stage of the estimation procedure of the OP/LP estimation algo-
rithms. Specifically, labor is likely to be a function of the same variables as the proxy,
i.e. φi t and ki t . Hence, whenφi t is controlled for nonparametrically, there is little or
no variation left to identify the coefficient on labor βl in the first stage. Ackerberg,
Caves, and Frazer (2015) propose the following refinement. Instead of a two-step es-
timation procedure, they suggest inverting the proxy demand function conditional
on labor. No coefficient is estimated in the first step since the control function for
productivity also includes li t . Instead, the first stage produces an estimate of pre-
dicted output as a function of production function coefficients as follows5:
yi t = κ(ki t , li t ,ei t , ιi t )+²i t (5.28)
where κ(ki t , li t , ιi t )=βl li t +βe ei t +βk ki t +h(ιi t ,ki t ).
The rest of the estimation proceeds similarly as before but with the following mo-
ment conditions:
E







These moment conditions are based on the law of motion of φi t as in equation
(5.25):
ηi t (βl ,βe ,βk )=φi t (βl ,βe ,βk )−φi t−1(βl ,βe ,βk )
and
φi t (βl ,βe ,βk )= κˆi t −βl li t −βe ei t −βk ki t
5.3.3 Survival Bias
Denote the exit decision of firm i in period t by χi t . Every period, after observing
φi t , firm i decides whether to stay in the market and produce (χi t = 1) or to exit
(χi t = 0). In equilibrium, there is a productivity cutoff φ∗t below which firms decide
to exit. Empirically, firms with larger capital ki t are more likely to survive the same
5In case ιi t = ei t , then yi t = κ(ki t , li t ,ei t )+²i t
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shock than firms with less capital. This is the classic survival bias and the survival
cutoff potentially depends on capital.
Results from chapters 3 and 4 indicate that electrification affects survival in the mar-
ket, creating tougher selection. This implies that to obtain consistent estimates, any
selection correction should account for the availability of the grid where the firm is
located, in addition to the classic survival bias. To address the selection bias, I allow
the survival threshold φ∗t to depend on access to the grid in addition to capital.
χi t =
1, iff φi t >φ
∗
t (ki t , accessi t )
0, otherwise
This creates a selection bias in the set of surviving firms that are observed in the data
and used to estimate the production function coefficients. Olley and Pakes (1996)
propose a sample selection correction by estimating the probability of survival as
follows:
Pr (χi t = 1|Ii t−1)= Pr (φi t ≥φ∗t (ki t , accessi t )|Ii t−1)
= pt (φ∗t (ki t , accessi t ),φi t−1)
= pt (ιi t−1,ki t−1, ii t−1, accessi t )
where the last equality uses the fact that ki t is fully determined by investment6 and
capital in period t −1 and that φi t−1 is a function of ιi t−1 and ki t−1 using equation
(5.22). The estimation equation conditional on survival is:
E [yi t −Σv βˆv vi t |Ii t−1,χi t = 1]=βk ki t + [φi t |Ii t−1,χi t = 1] (5.29)
=βk ki t + g (φi t−1,φ∗t (ki t , accessi t )) (5.30)
Given that ki t appears twice on the right hand side of the above equation, a separate
estimate forφ∗t (ki t , accessi t ) is required in order to identify βk . To get this estimate,
the probability of survival, which can be estimated using a probit model where the
left hand side is a survival dummy with capital and investment on the right hand
side. Olley and Pakes (1996) show that the probability of survival can be inverted
to recover φ∗t (ki t ), conditional on φi t−1, which is estimated in the first step of the
6In the case where investment is the proxy, this equation becomes:Pr (χi t = 1|Ii t−1) = Pr (φi t ≥
φ∗t (ki t , accessi t )|Ii t−1)= pt (ki t−1, ii t−1, accessi t ).
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algorithm.
Note that including access in the estimation of survival requires the assumption
that access is contemporaneously uncorrelated with the innovation term in the law
of motion of φ. In particular, I assume that access in period t is pre-determined
where the planner decides to extend the grid a particular location in period t after
observing the productivity of firms in that location φi t−1, conditional on access in
period t −1.
Olley and Pakes (1996) find that when using an unbalanced panel of firms, their cor-
rection for sample selection does not affect their estimates. This shows that when
using an unbalanced panel the survival bias is negligible. As a result, the subsequent
literature including Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer
(2015) has ignored this bias and focused mainly on the simultaneity bias. Given
that my results show that selection in response to electrification is important in the
context of this paper, I will account for both biases in my estimation.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Firm-Level Revenue Productivity
In this chapter, my goal is to evaluate the effect of electrification on average firm-
level productivity. Productivity is defined as the efficiency with which a firm trans-
forms inputs into output. I take the above methodology to the data and discuss
some of the data-related issues that arise as necessary. Let F (.) be an industry level
production technology. Output quantity Qi t of firm i in year t if produced accord-
ing to Qi t = exp(φi t )F (Xi t ,β). Firm productivity is φi t , Xi t is a vector of production
inputs; capital, labor, and electricity. Typically, physical output Q is not observed.
Instead we observe firms sales revenue Ri t = Pi t ∗Qi t . Consider the revenue based
production function (in logs):
ri t = pi t +qi t = f (xi t ,β)+φi t +pi t +²i t (5.31)
where ²i t is an error term. Since also prices are unobersvable, the literature typically
estimates revenue productivity, or profitability, TFPR, defined as:
T F PRi t =φi t +pi t (5.32)
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I first estimate the effect of electrifying a desa on average revenue productivity esti-
mated following Olley and Pakes (1996) by running the following regression:
T F PRi v pst =α+βAccessv pst +νXi v pst +ηVv pt +γp +δst +²i v pst (5.33)
I use two estimates of revenue productivity for comparison. The first measure T F PRop
is estimated following Olley and Pakes (1996) using investment as a proxy. The sec-
ond measure T F PRac f is based on the Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015) refine-
ment as detailed above, using electricity spending as proxy. Production function
estimates from each method are presented in tables 5.5 and 5.6 in appendix 6.5.
Results from regression 5.33 with both measures of TFPR, using distance to the hy-
pothetical grid as an instrument, are presented in table 5.2. The OLS results are pre-
sented in panel A and the IV results are presented in panel B. As before, the OLS es-
timate are smaller in magnitude than the IV estimates and are biased towards zero.
Using the Olley Pakes TFPR measure in column (1) panel B, the causal effect of elec-
trification on average revenue productivity in a desa is an 18% increase. Column (2)
panel B shows that the results are similar when using T F PRac f and are not sensi-
tive to the method used or to the proxy. Panel C presents the reduced form results
and indicated that the closer a desa is to the hypothetical least cost grid, the higher
average revenue productivity is.
It is worth noting that the goal of this regression is to estimate the causal difference
in average revenue productivity between electrified and non-electrified desas. This
is theoretically consistent with the empirical model in section 5.2 and the first order
Markov process assumption on the law of motion of productivity in equation 5.25. It
is common in the literature to run within firm regressions of productivity on a treat-
ment variable and interpret the effect as causal. This is theoretically inconsistent
with the Olley and Pakes (1996) and other methodologies which these papers typ-
ically follow. This is because these methodologies assumes that productivity only
depends on its lag. The assumption is therefore that productivity cannot depend
on or be affect by anything that is not its lag. The correct way of doing this would
be to incorporate the treatment variable in the law of motion of productivity as in
De Loecker (2013).
This criticism does not apply in the case of equation 5.33 for the simple reason that
I am not estimating within firm changes in productivity (I do not include firm fixed
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effects). The interpretation of the coefficients in panel B is a causal difference in
TFPR between electrified and non-electrified desas, caused by the competitive ef-
fects of electrification.
Table 5.2: Effect of electrification on TFPR.
Sample: Firm-Level
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable log(TFPRop ) log(TFPRac f )
Panel A: OLS
Accessv pt 0.0184* -0.008
(0.0100) (0.0138)
Panel B: IV
Accessv pt 0.177** 0.353**
(0.089) (0.138)
First Stage F 43.76 43.76
Panel C: Reduced Form IV
Z (KM) -0.000486** -0.001***
(0.000236) (0.00034)
Observations 134,391 134,391
IndustryxYear FE X X
Province FE X X
Geo Controls X X
Firm Controls X X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from OLS and IV and Reduced-Form regressions of TFPR on access defined at the
desa level. TFPR is measured following Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015) using electricity spend-
ing as a proxy. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the desa level. Geographic controls
are defined at the desa level and include distance to coast, distance to nearest city, elevation, distance
to road, desa political and legal status, and infrastructure controls. Firm Controls include export, co-
hort, and ownership dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the desa level.
5.4.2 Reallocation at the Regency-by-Industry Level
The evidence so far indicates that electrification increases firm turnover in a desa
by allowing more firms in and increasing the probability of exit. This leads to an
increase in the average firm productivity in the manufacturing sector. Does electri-
fication improve the reallocation of resources towards more productive firms? To
answer this question, I aggregate revenue productivity at the regency-by-industry
level. A regency is the second highest administrative division in Indonesia. There
are around 100 regencies in Java. On average a regency has 250 desas and around
250 firms per regency. An industry is a two-digit industry classification. I call each
101
CHAPTER 5. ELECTRIFICATION, PRODUCTIVITY, AND REALLOCATION
regency-by-industry pair a sector. I decompose the sector TFPR index Ωst , defined
as the revenue-weighted average of log firm revenue productivity TFPR in an indus-
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T F PRi t )
= T F PRst +N cov(Si t ,T F PRi t )
(5.34)
where Si t is firm i revenue share in sector s. T F PRst is the unweighted average
of log revenue productivity across all firms in industry s in year t . The Olley-Pakes
covariance term measures allocative efficiency. It is higher when more productive
firms have larger market shares. I test how electrifying more desas within a regency
affects the industry. I define Accessst as a dummy = 1 if at least 0.5 of firms are
within 15K M of the nearest substations. I use a similar identification strategy as at
the desa level where I instrument access with the average distance in the industry
to the hypothetical grid. The estimation equation is:
Yst =α+βAccessst +γpt +δs +²st (5.35)
where with province-by-year fixed effect and sector fixed effect. Table 5.3 presents
the results. The IV estimates in panel B show that access increases both weighted
and unweighted productivity at the sector level. In addition, the Olley Pakes co-
variance term increases with access. This means that electrification increases the
covariance between market share and revenue productivity. Reallocation is more
efficient in regions-by-industry groups with larger electrified proportions. This is
evidence for a firm turnover mechanism where electrification helps reallocating re-
sources towards more productive firms.
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Table 5.3: Olley-Pakes Revenue Weighted Productivity Decomposition
Sample: Sector-Level
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Weighted Average Unweighted Average Covariance
log(TFPROP ) log(TFPROP ) (log(TFPROP ), shar e)
Panel A: OLS
Accessv pt 0.140*** 0.0114 0.121***
(0.0249) (0.0123) (0.0197)
Panel B: IV
Accessv pt 0.550*** 0.261*** 0.278**
(0.163) (0.0945) (0.109)
First Stage F 36 36 36
Panel C: Reduced Form IV
Z (KM) -0.00213*** -0.000998*** -0.00106***
(0.000549) (0.000292) (0.000410)
Observations 9,899 9,899 9,899
Industry FE X X X
ProvincexYear FE X X X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the sector level
5.5 Electrification and Capital-Biased Technological Change
In this section, I investigate whether electrification leads to a change in the produc-
tion technology of firms in a way that is biased towards capital. The idea is that if
electricity and capital are complementary, then having access to cheaper electricity
might lead the firm to invest in machines that are more productive but more elec-
tricity intensive. This is one potential explanation for the observed differential input
substitution responses between access electricity, capital and labor found in chap-
ter 4 table 4.2. In other words, what could be driving these effects on input ratios
is a change in the production function coefficients, instead of only a change in the
inputs relative prices.
To test this possibility, I estimate a production function following the above proce-
dure allowing the coefficient on capital, βk , to be a function of access to the grid. In
order to check whether access affects capital differently than labor, I estimate a pro-
duction function allowing the capital coefficient to depend on access. I follow Olley
and Pakes (1996) using investment as a proxy to estimate the following production
103
CHAPTER 5. ELECTRIFICATION, PRODUCTIVITY, AND REALLOCATION
function:
Y =K βk+θaccessLβl Mβm exp(φ)exp(²)
where access is an access dummy, φ is the hicks-neutral productivity term as be-
fore, and ² is an exogenous shock unobservable to the firm. Estimation equation:
yi t =βk ki t +βl li t +βmmi t +θki t ∗accessi t +φi t +²i t
Table 6.11 shows there is limited evidence for a change in capital coefficient. The
estimate of θ is mostly zero across various industries, apart from two industriess.
Standard errors are bootstrapped at the industry level. This suggests that access
does not affect firms’ investment decision in technology, at least not in a few years.
This result is plausible, given that Indonesian manufacturing firms were using elec-
tricity in the 1990s, and since evidence from economic history shows that firms are
slow in adopting new technologies (see for example Atkeson and Kehoe (2007)).
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Table 5.4: Production Function Estimates with Capital Augment Energy
industry βl βm βk θ
15 0.38*** 0.48*** 0.06*** 0.008*
(0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.003)
16 0.25*** 0.66*** 0.04* 0.000
(0.032) (0.040) (0.020) (0.002)
17 0.34*** 0.58*** 0.04** 0.004
(0.018) (0.018) (0.011) (0.004)
18 0.37*** 0.54*** 0.02 0.002
(0.020) (0.014) (0.012) (0.006)
19 0.31*** 0.59*** 0.02* 0.004
(0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.011)
20 0.29*** 0.64*** 0.02 0.001
(0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.006)
21 0.33*** 0.58*** 0.12*** 0.008
(0.034) (0.025) (0.037) (0.013)
22 0.40*** 0.54*** 0.04* 0.015*
(0.029) (0.023) (0.019) (0.007)
24 0.41*** 0.52*** 0.06* 0.010
(0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.006)
25 0.28*** 0.65*** 0.05** 0.008
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.005)
26 0.47*** 0.44*** 0.05** 0.005
(0.014) (0.009) (0.015) (0.003)
27 0.34*** 0.57*** 0.05 0.030
(0.045) (0.038) (0.066) (0.039)
28 0.27*** 0.62*** 0.06* 0.009
(0.025) (0.018) (0.020) (0.008)
29 0.32*** 0.53*** 0.08* 0.015
(0.031) (0.022) (0.041) (0.018)
31 0.35*** 0.59*** 0.12* 0.010
(0.054) (0.049) (0.061) (0.011)
32 0.30*** 0.56*** 0.05 0.012
(0.053) (0.040) (0.084) (0.073)
33 0.36*** 0.55*** 0.01 0.015
(0.079) (0.070) (0.059) (0.014)
34 0.48*** 0.52*** 0.02 0.016
(0.044) (0.025) (0.058) (0.043)
35 0.47 0.49*** 0.07** 0.021
(0.054) (0.033) (0.023) (0.017)
36 0.41*** 0.50*** 0.05* 0.002
(0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.004)
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5.6 Conclusion
To summarize, in this chapter I presented a model that lays out conceptually how
access to electricity can affect productivity in the industry. I then discuss produc-
tivity measurement issues and present solutions from the literature with a special
focus on electrification and the production function. Using productivity estimates,
I show that electrification increases average productivity in the desa and enhances
allocative efficiency at an aggregate level. These results show that electrification, by
increasing firm turnover, has productivity-enhancing effects on the aggregate econ-
omy. This is evidence that poor infrastructure, no access to electricity in this case,
can help explain the productivity gap between developing and developed countries.
By lowering barriers to entry, not only do the new firms benefit from production,
but this also has an aggregate effect by intensifying competition in the market and
weeding out relatively unproductive firms in the market.
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5.A Limitations of the Model
This model is very simple and abstracts from many features that could be important
in determining the effect of electrification on industry productivity.
• Trade: I assume that each location is a separate market and that firms don’t
sell in other locations. This is obviously an unrealistic assumption as these
firms are medium and large manufacturing firms and the desas are too small
to constitute their whole market. The model can be extended to allow for trade
across location as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and the comparative statics
with respect to sunk cost of entry and input price in the location’s own cutoff
all go through. Therefore, we can still learn something from the simple closed
economy model about the effect of electrification on productivity at the loca-
tion level.
• Spillovers: Given that the true model involves trade across different locations
and since most firms in my data produce tradable goods, the presence of
spillovers across different locations complicates the interpretation of my re-
sults. Electrifying one location can have an effect on firms in other locations,
and these effects are likely to be negative. What I estimate as the average dif-
ference between electrified and non-electrified locations could be therefore a
combination of creation of new economic activity and relocation of economic
activity from those who don’t get electrified (or are already electrified) to lo-
cations that get newly electrified. An important question is whether there is
any creation of new economic activity in response to electrification, or does
electrification only displace economic activity? I addressed this question in
the empirical section where I test for the presence spillovers in chapter 3 and
4. The results show that spillovers are minimal in this particular setting. The-
oretically, the size of the spillovers depend the substitutability of the prod-
ucts being traded, transportation costs, and the number of trading partners. If
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transportation costs are very large, then spillovers will be minimal. Spillovers
can also be minimal if there is a very large number of markets: the general
equilibrium effects will be small because each market is too small to affect
other markets.
5.B Additional Results
Table 5.5: Production Function Coefficients, Olley-Pakes
industry Returns to Scale βk βl βm βe
15 1.07 0.07 0.21 0.50 0.29
16 1.07 0.02 0.38 0.59 0.08
17 1.03 0.03 0.32 0.64 0.04
18 0.99 0.00 0.34 0.59 0.06
19 1.04 0.03 0.32 0.52 0.17
20 1.08 0.03 0.35 0.68 0.02
21 1.46 0.02 0.55 0.73 0.16
22 1.07 0.06 0.35 0.55 0.12
23 1.11 0.24 0.01 0.79 0.06
24 1.05 0.05 0.32 0.59 0.09
25 1.02 0.06 0.26 0.66 0.05
26 1.09 0.03 0.61 0.41 0.04
27 2.50 0.26 1.67 0.15 0.42
28 1.02 0.05 0.23 0.66 0.08
29 1.00 0.09 0.23 0.57 0.11
31 1.30 0.05 0.15 1.04 0.06
32 1.19 0.10 0.03 0.60 0.46
33 1.14 0.02 0.53 0.56 0.03
34 1.07 0.00 0.37 0.56 0.14
35 1.12 0.03 0.53 0.56 0.00
36 1.04 0.04 0.37 0.55 0.07
Average 1.16 0.39 0.06 0.59 0.12
Notes: Estimated coefficient of a Cobb-Douglas production function in capital, labor, materials
and electricity following Olley and Pakes (1996) using the investment proxy as detailed in section 5.3.
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Table 5.6: Production Function Coefficients, ACF
industry Returns to Scale βk βl βm βe
15 1.40 0.00 1.21 0.14 0.05
16 1.27 0.06 0.30 0.81 0.10
17 1.02 0.04 0.29 0.64 0.06
18 1.01 0.02 0.41 0.55 0.03
19 1.03 0.03 0.34 0.56 0.09
20 0.98 0.04 0.24 0.67 0.03
21 0.99 0.01 0.21 0.75 0.02
22 1.09 0.03 0.39 0.52 0.14
23 1.29 0.17 0.22 0.88 0.01
24 1.02 0.05 0.19 0.60 0.18
25 1.01 0.04 0.26 0.68 0.04
26 1.08 0.03 0.59 0.42 0.04
27 1.03 0.14 0.11 0.73 0.05
28 1.05 0.05 0.34 0.42 0.24
29 1.09 0.07 0.46 0.54 0.02
31 1.05 0.02 0.23 0.62 0.18
32 1.08 0.09 0.29 0.58 0.12
33 1.10 0.02 0.27 0.52 0.30
34 1.10 0.00 0.41 0.48 0.21
35 1.11 0.03 0.49 0.56 0.03
36 1.17 0.06 0.68 0.41 0.03
Average 1.09 0.38 0.05 0.57 0.09
Notes: Estimated coefficient of a Cobb-Douglas production function in capital, labor, materials
and electricity following Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015) using the electricity spending proxy as
detailed in section 5.3.
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Chapter 6
Electrification, Marginal Cost, and
Market Power
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I evaluated the effect of electrification on average produc-
tivity in the industry and reallocation. I relied on revenue-based production func-
tion estimation techniques to estimate production function coefficients and ulti-
mately back out revenue productivity estimates, TFPR. Traditional techniques of
revenue-based production function estimation (e.g. Olley and Pakes (1996), Levin-
sohn and Petrin (2003) and Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015)) suffer from well-
known demand side biases as documented by the literature 1.
The reason why sales revenue is more widely used as the output variable when es-
timating production functions is that physical quantities are seldom observed in
typical firm-level datasets. Using sales revenue instead of physical quantity risks
contaminating the estimation by prices in two ways. The first is that the presence
of prices in the productivity term creates another sources of endogeneity of inputs
and failing to account for that will result in inconsistent production function co-
efficients. Second, when using TFPR measures to evaluate the effect of a certain
treatment, electrification in the case of this paper, on productivity, the estimated
effect will be a combination of the effect of the treatment on productivity and the
1Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) show that unobserved demand shocks can significantly
bias estimates of productivity, or marginal cost.
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effect on price. Recall from chapter 5 equation 5.32:
T F PRi t =φi t +pi t
Suppose electrification increases average productivity φi t in the market. But higher
productivity leads to lower prices. Therefore electrification would lower average
prices in the market. Given these two opposing effects, using TFPR measures to
evaluate the effect of electrification on industry productivity is not ideal as the de-
mand side effects will confound the resulting estimates. I present a solution in this
chapter, and discuss additional issues that would arise from this solution.
I estimate a quantity-based production function at the industry level, using rich
product-level price and quantity data. Given that price data are available and mark-
ups can be recovered from production function estimates, I will provide structural
estimates of marginal cost. Using mark-up and marginal cost estimates, I will ana-
lyze the effect of electrification on the firms’ cost structure and market power.
6.2 Quantity-Based Production Function Estimation
One way to avoid demand side biases is to estimate a quantity-based, product-level,
production function. I acquired a supplement to the manufacturing census where I
observe for each product the firm produces in a certain year the sales revenue and
the sales volume, or quantity. Using revenue and quantity data allows me to calcu-
late prices.
I therefore take advantage of the price and physical quantity data which I observe
(and are most likely set) at the product level to estimate a quantity-based product-
level production function. Using the production function estimates, and making
some structural assumptions on the data, I am able to estimate the following un-
observed measures: (i) physical productivity, (ii) markups, and (iii) marginal cost. I
detail the estimation methodology below.
Two additional biases arise when estimating quantity-based production function.
The first is an input price bias since input quality is not observed. The second is
the input allocation bias as input allocation across products within multi-product
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firms2 is unobserved. I closely follow De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavc-
nik (2016) in dealing with these biases with two differences. The first is the choice of
inputs in the production function. I use a translog production function in capital,
labor, and electricity3. The choice of functional form allows for a richer substitution
pattern (relative to a Cobb-Douglas) between inputs to understand the role of ac-
cess to energy in affecting marginal cost. Second, I allow unobservable input prices
to depend on access. I describe briefly the procedure below4.
6.2.1 Empirical Framework
First consider the production function of product j produced by firm i in year t in
logs:
qi j t = f j (xi j t ,β)+φi t +²i j t (6.1)
where the vector xi j t contains ki j t , li j t ,ei j t , the product specific physical capital, la-
bor, and energy and β is a vector of production function parameters. In practice, for
input x, we observe a deflated version of xi j t at the firm level x˜i t where the following
relationship holds in logs:
xi j t = ρi j t + x˜i t −w xi j t (6.2)
In equation 6.2, ρi j t is the log share of firm input expenditure dedicated to product j
and w xi j t if the log deviation of firm-product specific price of input from the industry
average. Substituting 6.2 in 6.1 yields:
qi j t = f j (x˜i j t ,β)+ A(ρi j t , x˜i j t ,β)+B(w xi j t ,ρi j t , x˜i j t ,β)+φi t +²i j t (6.3)
The A(.) function represents the bias stemming from unobserved input allocation
across products within firm. I deal with this bias first by estimating the produc-
tion function for single product firms only5 while correcting for selection into being
a single product firm6. When estimating equation (6.3) for single product firms,
2The median number of products per firm per year is 2.
3The translog production function takes the following form
q =βk k+βkk k2+βl l +βl l l 2+βe e+βee e2+βlk l k+βke ke+βle le+βl ek lek+φ
4I refer the reader to De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (2016) for a more detailed
discussion.
5This is a sub-sample of all firms that are producing a single product at any point in time, includ-
ing firms that become multiproduct firms in later periods (and vice versa) and those who remain
single product.
6a procedure similar to controlling survival as in Olley and Pakes (1996).
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the A(.) term drops out. The B(.) term represents the input price bias. De Loecker,
Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (2016) show that input prices are a function of
output prices pi t 7 and other variables proxying for product quality such as mar-
ket share msi t , location dummies Gi and product dummies Ki . In addition to these
variable, I allow input prices to depend on access Ci t . This gives rise to the following
input price control function8:
w xi t =wt (pi t ,msi t ,Ki ,Gi ,Ci t ) (6.4)
In practice, w xi t is estimated by a polynomial in the terms of the wt (.) function.
This leaves one bias remaining, which is the classical bias from unobserved produc-
tivity φi t . I follow the literature as in Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) and Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015) by using the first order condition of
a variable input, in my case electricity spending, as a proxy for productivity9.
The final step is to deal with the input allocation bias represented by the A(.) term
for multi-product firms. Given the estimated production function coefficients and
the input price control, φi t and the ρi j t ’s can be solved for using the residual from
6.3, as the only unknown is the ρi j t ’s from A(.) function10 and φi t is the constant.
This is done by solving a simultaneous system of equations where the left hand side
is the residual from 6.3 and the unknowns are the ρi j t ’s and φi t .
6.2.2 Production Function Estimates
Following the procedure above, I estimate a production function for each two-digit
industry using product level quantity data. I assume f j (x˜i j t ,β) to be a translog func-
tion in capital, labor and electricity spending. Below, I present the average output
elasticities and discuss how electrification affects the different inputs differently.
Table 6.1 presents the average output elasticities with respect to the three inputs:
capital, labor, and energy across all firms from all industries in the data. The break-
7Vertical differentiation model
8Coefficients of the input price control function are not separately identified by input, so they
have to be firm specific instead of product specific.
9I implement the one step estimator as suggested by Wooldridge (2009)
10We know the functional form
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down of average elasticities by industry is presented in table 6.11 in Appendix 6.5.
The average output elasticity with respect to capital is 3%, with respect to labor 40%,
and with respect to energy is 24%. The second row of table 6.1 presents the standard
deviation of these elasticities: the translog production function allows different elas-
ticities across firms within an industry. The low elasticity of output with respect to
capital is expected. With constant returns to scale, the capital share is expected to
be around 30% and labor share around 70%. Once electricity or materials are in-
cluded in the production function, the capital share decreases substantially. Since
production in developing countries is more labor intensive, the capital share is ex-
pected to be low, especially when including electricity. Looking again at the average
elasticity of output with respect to energy of 24%, it is evident that energy, electric-
ity in particular, is an important factor of production. The detailed industry-level
average output elasticities can be found in tables 6.11 in Appendix 6.5.
Table 6.1: Average Output Elasticities
Capital Labor Energy
Mean 0.03 0.40 0.24
Std Dev (0.09) (0.23) (0.16)
In order to understand the substitution patterns between the different inputs, table
6.2 shows the average translog production function coefficients across all indus-
tries. Table 6.10 in appendix 6.5 presents the industry-level estimated production
function coefficients including those on the interaction between capital, labor, and
energy across different industries. βke is consistently larger that βl e indicating that
energy and labor are stronger substitutes than energy and capital. On average,βke is
2.3%. Not surprisingly, the sign ofβke indicates a certain degree of complementarity
between capital and electricity. On the other hand, βl e is on average equal to−4.6%,
showing that energy and labor are substitutes. These estimates are in line with the
firm-level IV estimates on input ratios in table 4.2. Capital and energy are more
complementary relative to labor and energy, creating differential re-optimization
responses in their respective ratio to energy. This leads to a more capital-intensive
production process.
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Table 6.2: Average Production Function Coefficients





βl l 0.032 (0.050)
βee 0.028 (0.030)
βl k 0.005 (0.112)
βke 0.023 (0.097)
βl e -0.046 (0.150)
βlek -0.001 (0.009)
A useful exercise is to see whether these production function estimates, coupled
with the reduced from estimates of the effect of access on inputs from table 4.1 pre-


















This exercise predicts, given the estimates output elasticities with respect to inputs
and the effect of access on inputs, that access would increase output by 1.76 times.
This number is comparable to and is around 70% of the reduced form estimate of
access on firm deflated sales in table 4.1, chapter 4. Note that this number includes
a total effect of access on average firm deflated sales as it combines the direct effect
of access on incumbents as well as changes induced by entry and exit.
6.2.3 Illustrating Demand-Side Bias in TFPR measures
I argued above that using TFPR measures to evaluate the effect of electrification on
productivity is not ideal. This is because of the demand-side bias resulting from
the presence of price in TFPR measures. I now illustrate this bias by comparing the
effect of electrification on TFPR estimates from chapter 5 to the effect of electrifica-
tion on physical productivity TFPQ measure estimated in this chapter.
Table 6.3 shows the OLS, IV, and reduced-form results of regressing TFPR on access,
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using the distance to the hypothetical least cost grid as an instrument. The OLS es-
timates are again smaller in magnitude than the IV estimate. Focusing on column
(1) panel B, I find that on average electrifying a desa increases revenue productivity
in the desa. To explore heterogeneity in the effect of access average revenue pro-
ductivity across entrants and incumbents, proxied by firm age, I estimate the same
equation for young and old firms separately. A young firm is a firm whose age is
below the median age. IV regressions in panel B show that this increase in average
revenue productivity is driven by an increase in the revenue productivity of younger
firms. This evidence is not necessarily consistent with a turnover channel where
electrification induces the inefficient incumbents to exit. We would expect that in
that case the average productivity of older firms is also higher. I replicate this anal-
ysis using different productivity estimates following Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer
(2015) and using electricity spending as a proxy for robustness. The results are pre-
sented in table 6.12 in appendix 6.5 and yield the same conclusion.
A potential reason could be demand side biases that arise when estimating a rev-
enue based production function. The above method fails to account for the biases
caused by the presence of price in T F PR. The goal is to check if connected firms
have on average higher physical productivity, φi t . Testing this channel with regres-
sions of T F PRi t on access is not ideal. To see why, consider equation (5.32). Sup-
pose that access increases the average productivity φi t . But price and productivity
φi t are negatively correlated: more productive firms have lower marginal costs and
therefore lower prices. This means that if access increases the average φi t in the
market and decreases the average price, the two effects can potentially cancel out.
Therefore, given that TFPR estimates are a combination of productivity and prices,
the results in columns (2) and (3) of table 6.3 could be driven by a differential effect
of access on prices for younger and older firms.
116
CHAPTER 6. ELECTRIFICATION, MARGINAL COST, AND MARKET POWER




Dependent Variable log(TFPR) log(TFPR) log(TFPR)
Panel A: OLS
Accessv pt 0.0184* 0.0179 0.0169
(0.0100) (0.0148) (0.0105)
Panel B: IV
Accessv pt 0.177** 0.369*** 0.060
(0.089) (0.003) (0.096)
First Stage F 43.76 36.81 33.08
Panel C: Reduced Form IV
Z (KM) -0.000486** -0.0010*** -0.00016
(0.000236) (0.00032) (0.00025)
Observations 134,391 47,921 86,439
IndustryxYear FE X X X
Province FE X X X
Geo Controls X X X
Firm Controls X X X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from OLS and IV and Reduced-Form regressions of TFPR on access defined at the
desa level. TFPR is measured following Olley and Pakes (1996). Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses clustered at the desa level. Geographic controls are defined at the desa level and include distance
to coast, distance to nearest city, elevation, distance to road, desa political and legal status, and in-
frastructure controls. Firm Controls include export, cohort, and ownership dummies. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses clustered at the desa level.
To separate the effects, I use the product-level price data and physical productiv-
ity estimates. I estimate the following equation for product j (which is a subset of
industry s) produced by firm i in desa v , province p, industry s and year t is:
y j i v pst =α+βAccessv pst +νXi v pst +ηVv pt +γp +δt +δ j +² j i v pst (6.6)
where δ j are product-level fixed effects.
Table 6.4 shows the results from regressing log price and φi t on access for all, young
and old firms. The OLS estimates in panel A are smaller in magnitude than the IV es-
timates as before. The IV estimates of the effect of access on φi t in panel B columns
(2), (4) and (6) are all positive, significant and of the same magnitude, indicating that
the difference in the average physical productivity of electrified and non-electrified
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firms is the same across firm cohorts. The coefficient in column (3) panel B shows
that the difference in price between products produced by young connected firms
and young unconnected firms is not statistically different from zero. However, there
is a negative effect of access on the average price of products produced by older
connected firms.
Together with the results on TFPR from table 6.3, the results from this table are con-
sistent with a significant demand side bias. There are two forces in play: electrifica-
tion increases average productivity in the market through selection and decreases
average prices at the same time. Therefore the effect of electrification on revenue
productivity is ambiguous, but unambiguously positive on "true" or physical pro-
ductivity. Going back to the model in section 5.2, these results show that the effect
of electrification on φ∗ is positive, in other words, electrification increases selec-
tion in the market. Using the sharp theoretical prediction in equation (5.15), this
results is consistent with electrification reducing barriers to entry, attracting more
entrepreneurs to the market, which in turn intensifies competition and forces the
less productive firms to exit. This evidence does not rule out an effect of electrifica-
tion on input prices px , but it does indicates that first effect through a reduction in
barriers dominates the second.
118
CHAPTER 6. ELECTRIFICATION, MARGINAL COST, AND MARKET POWER
Table 6.4: Impact of access on Price and φi t by Age Group.
All Young Old
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable log(Price) φi t log(Price) φi t log(Price) φi t
Panel A: OLS
Accessv pt -0.0125 0.108*** -0.0191 0.208*** -0.0129 0.0633
(0.0261) (0.0340) (0.0414) (0.0532) (0.0291) (0.0388)
Observations 127,427 127,427 40,406 40,406 86,226 86,226
Panel B: IV
Accessv pt -0.375 0.932*** 0.0845 0.931* -0.576* 0.804*
(0.245) (0.355) (0.397) (0.532) (0.319) (0.427)
Observations 127,427 127,427 40,406 40,406 86,226 86,226
First Stage F 25.23 25.23 17 17 16.27 16.27
Panel C: Reduced Form IV
Z (KM) 0.000803 -0.00199*** -0.000193 -0.00213* 0.00109** -0.00152**
(0.000500) (0.000678) (0.000901) (0.00120) (0.000521) (0.000713)
Observations 127,427 127,427 40,406 40,406 86,226 86,226
IndustryxYear FE X X X X X X
Province FE X X X X X X
Geo Controls X X X X X X
Firm Controls X X X X X X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from OLS and IV and Reduced-Form regressions of two different measures of TFPR
on access defined at the desa level using equation 6.6. Robust standard errors in parentheses clus-
tered at the desa level. Geographic controls are defined at the desa level and include distance to
coast, distance to nearest city, elevation, distance to road, desa political and legal status, and infras-
tructure controls. Firm Controls include export, cohort, and ownership dummies. Robust standard
errors in parentheses clustered at the desa level.
6.3 Prices, Marginal Costs, and Mark-ups
In this section, I use the product-level production function estimates to understand
how electrification affects the cost of production of the firm as well as its market
power. Before turning to the marginal cost estimates, I start by looking at what hap-
pens to product-level output when the grid arrives.
6.3.1 Electrification and Product-Level Output
Table 6.5 shows the effect of electrification on product-level sales revenue and sales
quantity using specification (6.6). Panel A presents OLS estimates, which are posi-
tive and significant. This indicates that access and output are postively correlated
at the product level, confirming the firm level results from chapter 4. Again, these
OLS estimates are smaller in magnitude than the IV estimates in panel B. The IV
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estimates show that the causal effect of access on compliers is around a 1.5 times
increase in average revenues and 2.5 times increase in average quantity sold relative
to non-compliers. These results are comparable to the firm-level estimates in table
4.1 from chapter 4, although a bit smaller. This is possibly because this product-
level starts from 1994 instead of 1990 like the firm-level panel, and is missing a few
years from the early nineties where the effects of electrification might have been the
largest. The fact that quantity increase by more than revenues is an indication that
prices might be going down as a result of electrification. Panel C presents the re-
duced form regression results which state that the product-level output measures
are decreasing in the distance to the hypothetical grid.
Table 6.5: Impact of access on the product-level Sales and Quantity.
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable Sales Quantity
(Log)
Panel A: OLS
Accessv pt 0.145*** 0.164***
(0.0485) (0.0562)
Panel B: IV
Accessv pt 0.942** 1.317**
(0.462) (0.557)
First Stage F 28.68 28.68
Panel C: Reduced Form IV
Z (KM) -0.00213** -0.00298**
(0.00102) (0.00120)
Observations 127,818 127,818
Product FE X X
Year FE X X
Province FE X X
Geo Controls X X
Firm Controls X X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from OLS , IV, and reduced form regressions of firm sales revenue and quantity on
access, using specification (6.6). Access is defined at the desa level. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses clustered at the desa level. Geographic controls are defined at the desa level and include dis-
tance to coast, distance to nearest city, elevation, distance to road, desa political and legal status,
and infrastructure controls. Firm Controls include export, cohort, and ownership dummies. Robust
standard errors in parentheses clustered at the desa level.
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6.3.2 Structural Estimates of Marginal Cost and Mark-up
In this section, I explore how access affects prices, marginal cost and mark-ups.
Given production function estimates, it is possible to estimate markups using the
elasticity of sales with respect to a variable input11 and the share of expenditure on
that input in the total sale of the product. To illustrate, consider firm i ’s cost min-
imization problem in time t using production technology Fi t (X 1i t , ..., X
V
i t ,Ki t )e
φi t
where X vi t if variable input v , and Ki t is the dynamic capital input and φi t is (log)
productivity. The Lagrangian function is therefore:
L (X 1i t , ..., X
V
i t ,Ki t ,λi t )=
V∑
v=1
W vi t X
v
i t+ri t Ki t+λi t (Qi t−Fi t (X 1i t , ..., X Vi t ,Ki t )eφi t ) (6.7)
Realizing that the Lagrangian multiplier is the shadow price of increasing output
by one unit, λi t is in fact the marginal cost of firm i in year t . Taking the first or-
der condition with respect to variable input X vi t and rearranging gives the following
expression for markup µi t ≡ Pi tλi t
µi t = θvi t (αxi t )−1 (6.8)
where θvi t ≡




is the elasticity of output with respect to input X and αxi t ≡
W vi t X
v
i t
Pi t Qi t
is the share of expenditure on X in the total sales which is observable in the
data. If price data is available, then marginal cost can be estimated as the ratio of
price to markup:
MCi t =λi t = Pi t
µi t
6.3.3 Results
As I describe above, production function estimates, coupled with observed prod-
uct level prices, allow me to obtain structural estimates of marginal cost. Table 6.6
investigates the effect of access on prices, marginal cost, and mark-ups using spec-
ification (6.6), which includes product-specific fixed effect (9 digit product code) to
ensure that the same type of products are compared.
The IV results are in panel B. Column (1) shows that effect of access on prices is neg-
ative, suggesting a competitive effect of electrification, although the difference be-
11Typically materials or electricity.
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tween price of electrified and non-electrified desas is not significant. This however
could be masked by selection effects and I explore that in the next section. Column
(2) shows that access causes the average marginal cost of firms in electrified desas
to decrease by 55% relative to non-electrified desas. Column (3) panel B shows that
products produced by connected firm have higher markups. Going back to equa-
tion (5.17) from the model predictions in chapter 5 section 5.2, average markups
conditional on survival are equal to µ¯= E [µ(c)|c < c∗]= 12 (c∗− c¯). The model gives
an ambiguous prediction on what would happen to electrification in response to
electrification. This is because there are two forces in play: a competitive force that
forces firms to decrease their mark-ups, and a selection force that attracts relatively
more efficient firms (or products) to the market. The result in panel B column (3)
therefore shows that competition effect of electrification is outweighed by the selec-
tion effects.
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Table 6.6: Impact of access on the product-level price, marginal cost, and markup.
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Price Marginal Cost Markup
(Log)
Panel A: OLS
Accessv pt -0.0199 -0.0591* 0.0392
(0.0259) (0.0347) (0.0272)
Panel B: IV
Accessv pt -0.318 -0.798*** 0.480*
(0.221) (0.304) (0.253)
First Stage F 28.68 28.68 28.68
Panel C: Reduced Form IV
Z (KM) 0.000718 0.00180*** -0.00109**
(0.000485) (0.000624) (0.000547)
Observations 127,818 127,818 127,818
Product FE X X X
Year FE X X X
Province FE X X X
Geo Controls X X X
Firm Controls X X X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from OLS , IV, and reduced form regressions of firm price, marginal cost, and markup
on access using specification (6.6). Access is defined at the desa level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses clustered at the desa level. Geographic controls are defined at the desa level and include
distance to coast, distance to nearest city, elevation, distance to road, desa political and legal status,
and infrastructure controls. Firm Controls include export, cohort, and ownership dummies. Robust
standard errors in parentheses clustered at the desa level.
As before, the estimated causal difference between electrified and non-electrified
desas is a combination of the effect of electrification on incumbents and a selection
effect where electrification attracts a different type of firms or products (or both).
The product-level results from this section are consistent with the firm-level re-
sults on sales and input demands. These results also confirm that one contribut-
ing mechanism to the positive effect of electrification on firm performance is cost-
based. Electrification decreases average marginal cost of production in the indus-
try, leading to an increase in average sales. Firms connected to the grid are therefore
more productive and electrification promotes manufacturing efficiency.
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6.3.4 Effect of Access on Incumbent Products
I now turn to evaluating the effect of access on within product-firm pair production
cost and pricing, or incumbent product-firm pairs. This exercise is useful because it
nets out the selection effects of electrification; both the selection of new firms and
the selection of new products produced by existing firms as a response to electrifi-
cation.
I estimate the below equation where outcomes y j i v pst include price, marginal cost,
and mark-up, all in log at the product level. I include a product-by-firm fixed ef-
fect to compare what happens within each firm-product pair when the grid arrives.
Again, I instrument Accessv pst with the distance to the hypothetical grid interacted
with time dummies.
y j i v pst =α+βAccessv pst +νXi v pst +ηVv pt +γ j i +δt +² j i v pst (6.9)
where γ j i is a product-by-firm fixed effect.
Table 6.7 presents the OLS, IV and reduced-form regression results of equation (6.9).
Panel A presents the OLS results for the price, marginal cost and mark-up. The OLS
is smaller in magnitude and biased towards zero relative to the IV estimates. Panel
B presents the IV results. Column (1) shows that for the same product a particular
firm produces, electrification reduces the price of that product by 54%. Compared
to the effect of access on average prices in table 6.6 panel B column (1), this effect
is large and significant. This suggests that electrification selects prices with higher
prices into the market.
Column (2) shows that marginal cost falls by a similar magnitude as the fall in price.
Consistently, the effect on mark-up in column (3) is zero. This indicate that the ef-
ficiency savings within a product-firm resulting from electrification are completely
passed through to the consumer. In addition, this effect is similar to the estimated
effect in table 6.6 panel B column (2), indicating that selection effect is similar to the
effect of electrification on incumbents.
Focusing again on the effect on mark-up in column (3), the fact that within product-
firm markup doesn’t fall and that across firms the mark-up increases is evidence for
selection where electrification selects a different type of firms or products that are
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able to charge higher markups. I now investigate which firms charge higher mark-
ups.
Table 6.7: Product-level price, marginal cost, and mark-up
Sample: Product-Level
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Price Marginal Cost Markup
(Log)
Panel A: OLS
Accessv pt 0.0476 0.0377 0.00997
(0.0347) (0.0343) (0.0212)
Panel B: IV
Accessv pt -0.782*** -0.701** -0.0753
(0.277) (0.289) (0.139)
First Stage F 7.53 7.53 7.53
Panel C: Reduced Form IV
Zx1995 -0.000358 4.16e-05 -0.000399
(0.000422) (0.000563) (0.000358)
Zx1996 0.00517*** 0.00495*** 0.000222
(0.000636) (0.000774) (0.000433)
Zx1997 0.000917 0.000524 0.000393
(0.000578) (0.000724) (0.000473)
Zx1998 0.000128 0.000894 -0.000766
(0.000676) (0.000800) (0.000525)
Zx1999 -7.72e-05 -1.28e-05 -6.45e-05
(0.000735) (0.000889) (0.000575)
Zx2000 0.000877 0.000956 -7.93e-05
(0.000734) (0.000887) (0.000555)
Observations 111,029 111,029 111,029
FirmxProduct FE X X X
Year FE X X X
Geo Controls X X X
Firm Controls X X X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from OLS, IV, and reduced-form regressions of product price, marginal cost, and
markup on access defined at the desa level from specification (6.9). Mark-up is estimated following
De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (2016). Marginal cost is calculated from observable
prices and estimated mark-ups. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the desa level.
Geographic controls are defined at the desa level and include distance to coast, distance to near-
est city, elevation, distance to road, desa political and legal status, and infrastructure controls. Firm
Controls include export, cohort, and ownership dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses
clustered at the desa level.
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Table 6.8 presents the results from a regression of log mark-ups on access, but split-
ting the sample by young and old firms. Splitting the sample this way will allow
us to understand which type of firms, i.e entrants or incumbents (proxied by age)
are the ones who are charging the higher mark-ups. Given that the results from ta-
ble 6.7 show that incumbents pass-through all their cost savings due to electricity
to consumers, it is possible that the selection effect driving the increase in average
mark-up in electrified areas is driven by new firms coming in and charging higher
mark-ups. Results in table 6.8 confirm this intuition. Column (1) presents the effect
of access on average mark-ups charged by young firms and column (2) the effect of
access on average mark-ups charged by old firms. The estimated IV coefficients in
panel B show that the average mark-up charged by young firms in electrified desas
is higher than the average mark-up charged by the same age group of firms in non-
electrified areas. In contrast, there is no statistically significant difference between
the average mark-ups charged by old firms in electrified and non-electrified desas.
These results are consistent with complete pass-through estimated in table 6.7. This
suggests that electrification is selecting a different type of firms into the market, and
these firms are charging higher mark-ups.
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Dependent Variable Markup Markup
(Log)
Panel A: OLS
Accessv pt 0.00149 0.0628*
(0.0369) (0.0330)
Panel B: IV
Accessv pt 0.718* 0.389
(0.407) (0.303)
First Stage F 19.14 18.89
Panel C: Reduced Form IV
Z (KM) -0.00170** -0.000787
(0.000821) (0.000614)
Observations 40,305 86,715
Product FE X X
Year FE X X
Province FE X X
Geo Controls X X
Firm Controls X X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from OLS , IV, and reduced form regressions of markup on access following equation
(6.6). Access is defined at the desa level. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the desa
level. The sample in column (1) is that of young firm where young is define as age below median.
The sample in column (2) is the sample of old firms with age above median. Geographic controls are
defined at the desa level and include distance to coast, distance to nearest city, elevation, distance to
road, desa political and legal status, and infrastructure controls. Firm Controls include export, co-
hort, and ownership dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the desa level.
6.4 Product Differentiation
The results from table 6.7 suggest that when the grid arrives to a desa, the price and
marginal cost of incumbent firms that keep producing the same products decrease
substantially. Together with the results from table 6.6, this indicates that the new
firms who enter post access are producing the same products (since I include 9-
digit product fixed effects) but are able to charge higher mark-ups.
Why are the new firms or new products selected into the market by electrification
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able to charge higher mark-ups? If these firms were producing exactly the same
products as those produced by incumbents then they wouldn’t be able to charge
higher mark-ups. Note that in all the above specification I include a fixed effect for
each product (9 digit level). A demand side effect where consumers in electrified
desas are willing to pay more for products in these desas can be ruled out since this
would mean that also incumbents can now increase their mark-ups.
For these firms to be able to charge higher mark-ups, it must be that they are pro-
ducing some differentiated products within the narrow definition of products I use
in the analysis. Product differentiation could be horizontal (different characteris-
tics) or vertical (better quality). Distinguishing between these two types of product
differentiation is not directly possible due to the fact that product characteristics
and product quality are not observable and cannot be estimated, at least without
imposing some restrictive structural assumptions on the data. Instead, I aim to
provide some suggestive evidence that firms with higher mark-ups are systemati-
cally different in their product mix and are more likely to provide different products
or innovate.
Table 6.9 evaluates the effect of access to the grid on the likelihood that a product
that was produced in the last two years - by the firm, in the desa, or in the district -
is still being produced in year t . Each of the outcome variables in table 6.9 is meant
to capture how much innovation or change in the product mix of the firm is taking
place, relative to the firm itself (columns (1) and (4)), relative to itself and products
produced by other firms in the desa (columns (2) and (4)) and relative to itself and
the other products available in the district (columns (3) and (6)). I take these three
dummies to be a measure of innovation in the product mix.
Columns (1)-(3) present the OLS, IV and reduced form regressions corresponding
to specification (6.6). Panel A shows the OLS estimates, which show that there is a
negative correlation between access and innovation. The IV estimates in panel B
show the causal effect of access on the difference in innovation between firms in
electrified and non-electrified desas. The coefficient in column (1) panel B shows
that products in electrified desas are 15% less likely to have been produced by the
same firm in the last two years. In other words, electrification leads on average to
more innovation in the product mix within the same firm in the cross section. In
column (2) panel B the IV coefficient is also negative and significant. It indicates
that products produced in electrified desas in period t are 15.5% less likely to have
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been produced in the previous two years in that desa. Similarly, the coefficient in
column (3) panel B shows that products produced in electrified desas in period t
are 12% less likely to have been produced in the previous two years in that same
district. Together, these results suggest that electrification increases innovation or
change in the product mix that firm produce relative to the products produced by
that same firm in the past, but also relative to other products produced in the same
location. This is evidence for some degree of product differentiation as a result of
electrification, and could potentially explain why mark-ups in electrified desas are
higher.
Columns (4)-(6) in table 6.9 replicate the same analysis but with the addition of
firm-by-product fixed effects as in specification 6.9 in order to estimate the effect
of access on incumbents’ product mix. The coefficient in column (4) panel B means
that a product is 30% more likely to be produced by the same firm if it has been
produced by that same firm after it gets access to the grid. Given that electrification
leads to substantial cost savings within the same firm-product pair (table 6.7), it is
not surprising that firms will keep producing the same product post access.
Relative to the coefficient in column (1), this estimate only captures the effect on
incumbents as opposed to a combination of the effect on incumbents and the se-
lection effect of firms that enter after the grid arrives. The fact that the effect on the
incumbents’ likelihood of keeping the same product is positive whereas in the cross
section the effect is negative means that electrification is selecting firms that inno-
vate or experiment more in the products they produce into the market.
The coefficients in columns (5) and (6) panel B show that incumbents are also more
likely to produce products that were produced in the desa or the district the last two
years when the grid arrived, although these effects are not statistically different than
zero. Given that the coefficients in columns (2) and (3) are negative and significant,
this again means that electrification selects firms that produce products that are dif-
ferent than what is offered in the desa. All this evidence suggests that electrification
leads to more product differentiation. Table 6.13 in appendix 6.B to this chapter re-
peats the analysis in table 6.9 but going back 5 years instead of 2 for robustness. The
conclusions of this section remain unchanged.
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Table 6.9: Impact of access on product mix
All Incumbents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Produced in by firm in desa in district by firm in desa in district
last 2 years
Panel A: OLS
Accessv pt -0.0101* -0.00539 -0.00272 -0.00568 -0.0258 -0.0211
(0.00565) (0.00711) (0.00664) (0.0193) (0.0181) (0.0172)
Panel B: IV
Accessv pt -0.148*** -0.155*** -0.119** 0.301** 0.182 0.200
(0.0513) (0.0573) (0.0570) (0.150) (0.130) (0.128)
First Stage F 28.68 28.68 28.68 7.53 7.53 7.53
Panel C: Reduced Form IV
Z (KM) 0.000334*** 0.000351*** 0.000270**
(0.000101) (0.000108) (0.000120)
Zx1995 -0.00128*** -0.00105*** -0.00106***
(0.000320) (0.000288) (0.000283)
Zx1996 -0.000537** -0.000181 -0.000191
(0.000268) (0.000274) (0.000264)
Zx1997 0.00201*** 0.00107*** 0.000953***
(0.000416) (0.000402) (0.000369)
Zx1998 0.00111*** 0.000712** 0.000696**
(0.000350) (0.000305) (0.000285)
Zx1999 -0.000465 0.000150 0.000306
(0.000319) (0.000266) (0.000257)
Zx2000 -0.000475 -0.000454* -0.000309
(0.000320) (0.000276) (0.000260)
Observations 127,818 127,818 127,818 111,029 111,029 111,029
Product FE X X X
FirmxProduct FE X X X
Province FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
Geo Controls X X X X X X
Firm Controls X X X X X X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from OLS and IV and Reduced-Form regressions of product mix dummies on access using equation (6.6) in
colums (1)-(3) and equation (6.9) in columns (4)-(6). The dependent variable in columns (1) and (4) is a dummy variable equal
to one if product j is being produced by firm i in year t and has been produced by firm i any time since t −2. The dependent
variable in colums (2) and (5) ((3) and (6)) is a dummy equal to one if product j is being produced by firm i in desa v (district
d) in year t and has been produced in desa v (district d) any time since t −2. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered
at the desa level. Geographic controls are defined at the desa level and include distance to coast, distance to nearest city, ele-
vation, distance to road, desa political and legal status, and infrastructure controls. Firm Controls include export, cohort, and
ownership dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the desa level.
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6.5 Conclusion
In summary, I find that electrification increases average physical productivity. Elec-
trification leads to substantial cost savings in incumbent products, and these sav-
ings are completely passed through to consumers. However, electrification on av-
erage increases average mark-ups in the industry. This is due to the selection of
possibly differentiated products that enter the market post electrification. I show
that electrification selects products that are less likely to be produced before either
by the firm itself or in the geographic vicinity.
Electrification has some welfare enhancing effects on the market in two ways: first it
reduced the price of existing products that survive. Second, it increases the variety




6.A Production Function Estimates
Table 6.10: Production Function Coefficients
industry βk βk βe βkk βl l βee βlk βke βle βlek
15 0.280 0.632 0.399 -0.014 0.016 0.035 -0.004 -0.009 -0.088 0.002
16 -0.082 0.012 0.291 -0.005 0.062 0.035 0.023 0.017 -0.062 -0.002
17 0.750 0.465 0.213 -0.004 0.067 0.039 -0.071 0.006 -0.088 0.001
18 -0.737 -1.564 -0.770 0.003 0.068 0.016 0.071 0.084 0.067 -0.009
19 0.658 1.002 1.290 0.008 0.118 0.049 -0.118 -0.006 -0.228 0.005
20 -1.086 -2.216 -1.821 -0.001 0.063 -0.013 0.093 0.177 0.176 -0.014
21 2.401 3.239 2.779 -0.019 0.105 0.087 -0.218 -0.108 -0.458 0.015
22 1.993 2.931 3.994 0.004 -0.008 -0.049 -0.179 -0.223 -0.228 0.018
23 6.391 13.630 10.023 0.146 0.188 -0.010 -1.074 -0.461 -1.005 0.055
24 -0.048 2.323 0.904 0.011 -0.019 0.045 -0.022 -0.017 -0.140 0.002
25 -1.660 -1.374 -2.248 -0.013 -0.034 0.050 0.202 0.144 0.163 -0.015
26 -0.193 0.583 0.078 0.005 0.028 0.048 -0.005 0.016 -0.084 0.000
27 -2.752 -4.106 -6.890 -0.013 0.076 0.064 0.202 0.413 0.368 -0.028
28 0.121 0.290 0.497 0.008 0.014 0.022 -0.015 -0.040 -0.048 0.002
29 -0.538 1.568 0.870 -0.017 -0.071 -0.017 0.061 -0.001 -0.064 0.003
31 2.556 2.693 2.254 0.019 0.188 -0.097 -0.463 0.039 -0.294 0.016
32 -7.002 -3.840 -11.889 -0.007 -0.145 0.115 0.568 0.664 0.735 -0.051
33 -4.390 -5.584 -5.044 0.075 0.207 0.068 0.156 0.403 0.269 -0.029
34 1.090 -0.862 4.668 0.049 0.310 0.118 -0.166 -0.160 -0.528 0.010
35 2.002 2.190 4.505 0.050 0.147 0.094 -0.270 -0.306 -0.497 0.024
36 -0.893 -0.373 -0.523 0.005 0.001 -0.009 0.084 0.060 0.081 -0.007
37 -0.926 -1.149 -0.915 0.000 -0.025 -0.002 0.117 0.054 0.133 -0.008
Average -0.082 0.228 0.076 -0.001 0.033 0.029 0.005 0.023 -0.048 -0.001
Notes: Estimated coefficient of a translog production function in capital, labor, and electricity following the pro-
cedure in section 6.2.1.
132
CHAPTER 6. ELECTRIFICATION, MARGINAL COST, AND MARKET POWER
Table 6.11: Average Output Elasticities
industry N nrobs Capital Labor Energy
15 Food and Beverages 29555 12520 0.03 0.40 0.28
(0.04) (0.07) (0.09)
16 Tobacco Products 4197 3435 0.00 0.69 0.26
(0.02) (0.19) (0.13)
17 Textiles 15517 3796 0.06 0.37 0.29
(0.09) (0.14) (0.15)
18 Wearing Apparel , Fur 14614 3581 0.02 0.41 0.10
(0.04) (0.19) (0.04)
19 Leather, leather products and footwear 5036 1691 0.02 0.67 0.27
(0.06) (0.22) (0.13)
20 Wood Products (excl. furniture) 7128 2312 0.07 0.15 0.11
(0.06) (0.18) (0.06)
21 Paper and paper products 2584 1013 0.17 0.20 0.32
(0.14) (0.49) (0.22)
22 Printing and Publishing 3846 740 -0.02 0.52 0.41
(0.12) (0.13) (0.24)
23 Coke, refine petroleum products, nuclear fuel 260 140 0.07 0.44 0.69
(0.53) (1.03) (0.30)
24 Chemicals and chemical products 9386 1761 0.04 0.53 0.27
(0.06) (0.34) (0.11)
25 Rubber and plastic products 9312 3226 0.04 0.20 0.29
(0.07) (0.13) (0.12)
26 Non-metallic mineral products 14797 3290 0.02 0.34 0.31
(0.06) (0.12) (0.14)
27 Basic metals 1065 503 0.11 0.20 0.31
(0.20) (0.27) (0.19)
28 Fabricated metal products 5829 2198 0.02 0.24 0.20
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 3410 1158 -0.04 0.51 0.24
(0.18) (0.21) (0.09)
31 Electrical Machinery and apparatus 1095 633 0.04 -0.00 0.32
(0.34) (0.55) (0.31)
32 Radio, television and communication equipment 498 336 0.13 0.47 0.33
(0.13) (0.54) (0.21)
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments 457 310 0.10 0.03 0.32
(0.23) (0.39) (0.19)
34 Motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers 934 691 0.04 -0.02 0.47
(0.15) (0.38) (0.28)
35 Other Transport Equipment 1693 790 0.03 0.35 0.40
(0.19) (0.30) (0.19)
36 Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c 11543 3393 -0.07 0.55 0.06
(0.07) (0.09) (0.02)
Average 14142.96 4762.09 0.03 0.39 0.24
Notes: Average output elasticities with respect to inputs from a translog production function in capital, labor, and electricity estimated following
the procedure in section 6.2.1.
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6.B Additional Results




Dependent Variable log(TFPRac f ) log(TFPRac f ) log(TFPRac f )
Panel A: OLS
Accessv pt -0.008 0.0167 -0.0208
(0.0138) (0.0174) (0.0161)
Panel B: IV
Accessv pt 0.353** 0.632*** 0.214
(0.138) (0.002) (0.152)
First Stage F 43.76 36.81 33.08
Panel C: Reduced Form IV
Z (KM) -0.001*** -0.0017*** -0.00057
(0.00034) (0.00047) (0.00038)
Observations 134,391 47,921 86,439
IndustryxYear FE X X X
Province FE X X X
Geo Controls X X X
Firm Controls X X X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from OLS and IV and Reduced-Form regressions of TFPR on access defined at the
desa level. TFPR is measured following Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015) using electricity spend-
ing as a proxy. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the desa level. Geographic controls
are defined at the desa level and include distance to coast, distance to nearest city, elevation, distance
to road, desa political and legal status, and infrastructure controls. Firm Controls include export, co-
hort, and ownership dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the desa level.
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Table 6.13: Impact of access on product mix
All Incumbents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Produced in by firm in desa in district by firm in desa in district
last 5 years
Panel A: OLS
Accessv pt 0.00185 0.00386 0.00652 -0.00286 -0.00877 -0.00467
(0.00554) (0.00558) (0.00572) (0.0183) (0.0165) (0.0164)
Panel B: IV
Accessv pt -0.0999** -0.121** -0.100** 0.266** 0.195* 0.182*
(0.0451) (0.0493) (0.0508) (0.126) (0.114) (0.108)
First Stage F 28.68 28.68 28.68 7.53 7.53 7.53
Panel C: Reduced Form IV
Z (KM) 0.000226** 0.000273*** 0.000226**
(9.88e-05) (0.000103) (0.000111)
Zx1995 -0.00116*** -0.00107*** -0.00106***
(0.000279) (0.000265) (0.000263)
Zx1996 -0.000281 -0.000175 -0.000156
(0.000222) (0.000222) (0.000220)
Zx1997 0.000718*** 0.000805*** 0.000817***
(0.000212) (0.000220) (0.000218)
Zx1998 0.00108*** 0.00109*** 0.00106***
(0.000300) (0.000303) (0.000303)
Zx1999 0.000304 0.000211 0.000137
(0.000321) (0.000307) (0.000304)
Zx2000 0.000368 -0.000372 -0.000364
(0.000615) (0.000703) (0.000664)
Observations 127,818 127,818 127,818 111,029 111,029 111,029
Product FE X X X
FirmxProduct FE X X X
Province FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
Geo Controls X X X X X X
Firm Controls X X X X X X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Results from OLS and IV and Reduced-Form regressions of product mix dummies on access using equation (6.6) in
colums (1)-(3) and equation (6.9) in columns (4)-(6). The dependent variable in columns (1) and (4) is a dummy variable equal
to one if product j is being produced by firm i in year t and has been produced by firm i any time since t −5. The dependent
variable in colums (2) and (5) ((3) and (6)) is a dummy equal to one if product j is being produced by firm i in desa v (district
d) in year t and has been produced in desa v (district d) any time since t −5. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered
at the desa level. Geographic controls are defined at the desa level and include distance to coast, distance to nearest city, ele-
vation, distance to road, desa political and legal status, and infrastructure controls. Firm Controls include export, cohort, and




In this thesis, I show that electrification has a substantial causal impact on the in-
dustrial sector. To make this possible, I collected a new and comprehensive dataset
on the electrification infrastructure in Indonesia and combined it with rich man-
ufacturing census micro data at various levels. Access to electricity attracts more
firms, increases competition, and increases industry productivity by weeding out
the less productive firms more often. Access to electricity can therefore help nar-
rowing the productivity gap between firms in developing and developed countries.
Electrification also changes the composition of firms: firms in electrified areas are
larger, more efficient, and sell more differentiated products that were not produced
before. All this evidence suggests that electrification is welfare improving.
I highlight a new economic mechanism through which electrification causes in-
dustrial development. This mechanism, firm turnover, is unlikely to operate in re-
sponse to short-run improvements in electricity supply. The extensive margin of
electrification induces extensive margin responses in firm decisions, which affects
the composition of firms in the industry. Electrification attracts more firms into a
market. This creates more competition and makes it more difficult for unproductive
firms to survive. By increasing firm turnover, electrification increases average pro-
ductivity in the market. This mechanism is similar to selection induced by trade lib-
eralization where exposing domestic firms to international competition forces the
least productive firms to exit as in Pavcnik (2002) and Melitz (2003). Electrification
therefore promotes industrial development by increasing the efficiency with which
markets allocate resources from unproductive firms towards more productive firms.
While the infrastructure literature has made substantial progress in understanding
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the effect of transportation (roads, railways) on development, we are at the very
beginning of understanding how access to energy affects economic development.
This thesis has taken a small step towards a better understanding of the relation-
ship between energy infrastructure and development. However, there is still a lot to
be learned. Electrification projects are typically large-scale costly investments and
it is important to quantify their benefits. In some instances, like in Lee, Miguel, and
Wolfram (2016) and Burlig and Preonas (2016), benefits from electrification do not
necessarily justify the investment and are not as large as we expect them to be. Large
investments in electrification have been made in various African countries over the
last decades, but Africa is yet to industrialize.
It is therefore important to understand how electrification and other institutional
features might interact. For instance, other large institutional barriers to entry or
to market access might prevent electrification from triggering entry and allowing
for productivity gains. In the presence of credit constraints, the effect of electrifi-
cation could be even larger, because it can lower the cost of entry for constrained
entrepreneurs and reduce the extent of misallocation. These are a few of the open
questions that remain to be answered in future work on electrification and develop-
ment.
Once we have a better understanding of how and when access to energy leads to
growth, it is then important to think about how we can provide energy and use it to
grow the economy without harming the environment. Energy is potentially essen-
tial to bring people out of poverty, but it is also important to provide it in a cheap
and sustainable way. This provides us with a new set of challenges and research
opportunities that we have not thought about previously in the experience of elec-
trification and industrialization in the developed world.
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